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Abstract: The Article explains why international trade and tax arrangements should advance
global wealth redistribution in a world of enhanced economic integration. Despite the
indisputable importance of global poverty and inequality, contemporary political philosophy
stagnates over the controversy of whether distributive justice obligations should extend
beyond the political framework of the nation state. This stagnation results from the difficulty
of reconciling liberal impartiality with notions of state sovereignty and accountability. The
Article offers an alternative approach that bypasses the controversy of the current debate. It
argues that international trade results in relational distributive duties when domestic parties
engage in transactions with foreign parties that suffer from an endowed vulnerability—such
as extreme poverty prevalent in the developing world. These relational duties differ from
“traditional” distributive claims because they rely on actual economic relationships, rather
than upon hypothetical social-contract scenarios. The Article establishes that in a
competitive market, private parties cannot address these relational distributives duties by
themselves, because doing so would put them at a competitive disadvantage, and argues that
the only common-action solution to this systemic problem in the current global political
setting is wealth transfers among states. The Article proceeds to suggest some policy
implication of this normative analysis in the field of international tax law. It points out that
the allocation of taxing rights is a form of wealth allocation that divides globalization’s
revenue-proceeds among nations. As such, tax allocation arrangements should help “correct”
international trade relationships that fail to meet relational distributive standards. This
discussion stresses a point frequently neglected by both the tax and political philosophy
literatures—that real-world attempts to promote a more just distribution of global wealth
could greatly benefit from integrating distributive considerations in tax allocation
arrangements.
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“If there will be among you a needy person, from one of your brothers in one of your
cities, in your land … you shall not harden your heart, and you shall not close your hand
from your needy brother.” (Deuteronomy 15:7).
“If there will be among you a needy person”: [Meaning that t]he most needy person has
priority… “in one of your cities:” [Meaning also that t]he poor of your city have priority
over the poor of another city. (Rashi commentary, emphasis added I.B.)

I. Introduction
Since its nascence, moral philosophy has been haunted by the need to prioritize
between aiding those in greatest need and fulfilling the needs of those more closely
related to us. This prioritization dilemma is even more important today, as global
commercial relationships shrink our world into a global village where the answer to the
question “Who is thy neighbor?” is less trivial than ever before. The Article offers a new
scholarly approach to how this question of prioritization should be addressed, and
discusses the concrete implication of this approach on international trade policy, and,
particularly, on international tax policy.
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Startlingly, even though global markets operate in a world characterized by
tremendous poverty and inequality—a world where 40% of people live on less than two
dollars a day, legal literature dealing with international taxation rarely addresses issues of
global distributive justice directly. Unlike the domestic frontier, where legal scholars
perceive the tax system as the key policy tool to promote redistribution, 1 the legal
scholarship is relatively silent on the tax system’s role in international redistribution. 2
This silence reflects upon a broader unresolved conflict in liberal political
philosophy over the scope of distributive justice claims. For the last four decades,
philosophers have been engaged in a stagnated debate over whether considerations of
distributive justice should be limited to the realms of the nation state. Globalization—
that is, the growth of economic interconnectedness and interdependence among
peoples—has forced this question out of the ivory tower, however.
Real world dilemmas regarding our moral obligations to the distant poor and to
questions of global inequality are increasingly becoming part of our everyday experience.
We encounter them when we buy cheap consumer goods made abroad, when we invest
our pension funds in multinational corporate enterprises (MNEs), and when we watch the
news. Global occurrences and trade issues also seem to occupy a growing role in the
political agenda. All of these daily experiences call upon moral political philosophy to
devise the structure and guidelines for an international global economic regime that will
balance our moral obligations to nearby compatriots with our obligations to needy
foreigners. Plainly put, globalization has placed the distant poor at our city gates so that
turning aside the consequences of global poverty and inequality is no longer possible. 3
There are two general approaches in contemporary liberal political philosophy to
questions of global distributive justice: Liberal-Cosmopolitanism and Liberal-Statism.
Liberal-Cosmopolitans such as Charles Beitz and Thomas Pogge argue that the notions
that all humans are equal and that national endowment is a matter of pure luck prescribe
that considerations of distributive justice should not be limited to the domestic realm. 4
Since every individual is a subject of equal moral concern, it is the liberal duty to
establish political institutions that would allow every individual an opportunity to lead a
decent autonomous life. In sharp contrast, Liberal-Statists, such as Thomas Nagel, David
Miller, and most notably John Rawls, argue that the claim for distributive justice is not
based on common humanity but on the special associative relationship among
compatriots. 5 Individuals’ reciprocal and cooperative long-term political engagement
with their compatriots, via the state, makes their national identity coincidental but not
morally arbitrary. The intimate and coercive nature of this arrangement justifies the
1

Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor? Clarifying the Role of Legal Rules
and the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 29 J. Legal Stud. 821 6 (2000)
2
These issues have been somewhat addressed by the political science literature. See generally Alexander
W. Cappelen, The Moral Rationale for International Fiscal Law, 15 Ethics & International Affairs 97
(2001) Thomas Rixen, Tax Competition and Inequality (copy with the author)
3
This is a paraphrase on the following expression “[Y]our transgressions are many and your sins are great,
you who…turn aside the poor at the gate” (Amos 5:12).
4
Charles R. Beitz, Justice and International Relations, 4 Philosophy & Public Affairs 360 (1975); Thomas
W. Pogge, Realizing Rawls (1989).
5
Thomas Nagel, The Problem of Global Justice, 33 Philosophy & Public Affairs 113 (2005); David Miller,
Against Global Egalitarianism, 9 Journal of Ethics 55 (2005); John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1999);
John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (1999). See also (making a somewhat similar point) Jack Goldsmith,
Liberal Democracy and Cosmopolitan Duty, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1667 (2003).
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claim for distributive justice on the one hand; common humanity, on the other hand,
gives rise only to claims of humanitarian assistance in times of crisis.
The essence of the conflict between the two approaches is the inherent clash in
liberalism between the notions of impartiality and (democratic) national sovereignty.
Nationality is something most do not choose but rather are born into, and therefore
favoring compatriots requires biased rules, which are antithetical to the common liberal
intuition that fair moral standards should be general and universal. However, as long as
independent sovereign nation states comprise the world political system, global
redistribution fundamentally conflicts with the notion of national sovereignty and
accountability. It does so because different sovereigns are each accountable only to their
own people, they act independently from each other, and they may even act against each
other. Accordingly, no global redistribution is possible in the absence of an effective
global political institution that governs how different peoples compete with each other.
Simply put, in a world where North Korea may spend money without asking Japan for
any authorization, and may indeed use it even to prepare for a war against Japan, the
Japanese will not be willing to engage in any cross border redistribution of wealth—
regardless of North Koreans’ poverty and the reasons for it.
The Liberal-Statist and Liberal-Cosmopolitan positions are distinct and
dichotomous; therefore, the conflict over the scope of distributive justice claims is not
likely to be resolved in the foreseeable future. More fundamentally, both approaches fail
to provide any guidance to policymakers operating in a hybrid global reality. This reality
does not align completely with either the Statist approach, because of the global market
and its enhanced interconnectedness, or with the Cosmopolitan approach, because there
are multiple state political entities operating independently. In the absence of such
normative guidance, policymakers have only vague ideas of what political morality
requires them to actually do. The absence of a concrete agenda thus makes it difficult to
internalize distributive considerations into the operation of international and supranational political institutions and to balance these considerations against other interests.
More fundamentally, this lack of a concrete agenda suggests that there is a gap in the
political philosophy discourse, which fails to reconcile individuals’ affinity towards
compatriots with the notion that they should not concurrently be indifferent to questions
of global poverty and inequality. The current discourse within liberal political
philosophy renders it impossible to translate these very real sentiments into a political
framework. The Article tries to fill this gap by offering an institutional analysis that
evaluates how existing state-based international trade and tax institutions could be made
to operate justly in terms of global wealth distribution. But, it does not aim to “solve the
world” by inventing alternative political institutions to replace the current international
political system.
The first objective of the Article is to advance the normative argument that it is
not necessary to resolve the Liberal Statist v. Cosmopolitan debate to start thinking about
what a more just allocation of global resources requires. The global distributive justice
debate can and should be bypassed by focusing on the way in which cross-border trade
relationships affect our moral duties to foreigners. I argue that international trade brings
peoples from different countries materially closer and allows them to establish long-term
economic relationships that once were limited to the local-domestic setting. Once these
relationships are set, they give rise to what I coin as “relational-distributive claims and
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duties.” The presence of these claims and duties helps to reconcile our moral distributive
dilemma between our obligations to compatriots and to foreigners. Although the moral
and redistributive obligations towards compatriots are generally stronger than the
relational duties towards foreigners producing the consumer goods one purchases, I
suggest that the accelerated integration of global economy makes obligations to
foreigners more tangible.
I base my argument on three non-controversial assumptions: that human history is
too complicated to allow historic rectification, that states will continue to exist, 6 and that
most individuals are concerned about issues of global poverty and inequality. Using
these assumptions, I examine the question of which actual relationships trigger claims
and duties of redistribution. Most relational duties, such as the duties between adult
family members, prescribe ethical principles with regard to the morality of human
behavior but do not typically require any external intervention of political institutions.
The Article’s main theoretical contribution is the claim that these relational duties
cause by globalization trigger distributive obligations towards foreigners and that these
duties should affect the structure of international and supra-national institutions
governing global trade. I establish this claim by demonstrating that commercial
relationships between peoples living in developed and developing countries may fall into
an unfair pattern—meaning that individuals living in developed countries tend to benefit
from global inequality and poverty in the developing world because of the frequent
unfairness in market transactions between them. Rather than developing a full theory of
transactional fairness, I explain why these market transactions fall into categories that
most people typically regard as immoral. Even though both parties arguably benefit from
voluntary transactions, they may be regarded as unfair if the benefits are unevenly
skewed to one party because of the low bargaining power of the other party that results
from an endowed vulnerability. This concern is exacerbated when the vulnerable party
has no real impact on the rules governing commercial interactions and when market
returns do not allow that party to meet minimal decent life standards. Unfortunately, this
case often arises with international trade. However, we should not conclude that
engaging in global trade with developing countries is morally wrong, or that global trade
harms individuals in developing countries. The unfair pattern merely points out that
long-term commercial relationships give rise to relational duties and that relationships
taking place in an international setting are not fundamentally different from those in
domestic settings. Critics may argue that relational duties have nothing to do with
redistribution but merely with reciprocal good conduct practices (e.g., the duty to enter a
contract in good faith). I, however, argue that in a reality in which global inequality and
poverty considerably impact international trade’s allocation of benefits, “fair business
conduct” compels parties to mitigate the impacts of the allocation in light of the
seemingly inherent disadvantages of the vulnerable party.
This unfair pattern is not a sign of moral faultiness but a systemic problem. In a
competitive market, individuals from developed countries have no alternative but to
reduce their costs as much as they legally can. This is therefore a classic common-action
problem, 7 in which market mechanisms prevent us from addressing the negative moral
6

Which entails a continuous adherence to favorable treatment of compatriots.
The economic theory of public goods justifies common-action. In its basic form, this theory suggests that
the free market cannot efficiently supply these goods—e.g., national security and clean air—because they
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externalities of our trade relationships with foreigners. This common action problem
justifies a political response, which assures that relational duties are met, or compensated
for when breached.
Addressing these relational duties requires restructuring the rules and institutions
governing international trade. As such, the second objective of the Article is to advance
an institutional framework through which relational distributive duties could be met. Put
differently, the first objective is to identify the source of the redistributive duty; the
second objective is to suggest some concrete measures that can help policymakers
quantify and balance that duty with other considerations. In this context, I suggest that
international tax allocation arrangements are one appropriate way to accommodate these
global relational redistributive duties.
This proposal captures two important (and realistic) conceptual insights about
what would be required from an effective and politically sustainable international
distributive scheme: First, it requires transfers among states and cannot rely on the private
or NGO sectors; and second, it requires some type of (commercial) relationship to trigger
distributive claims and duties among peoples. Because international tax law is an
inherent part of every cross border transaction, the allocation of taxing rights could be
used as an alternative to direct regulation of business practices thought to be unfair.
Instead of decreasing international trade’s negative moral externalities by limiting
business practice, the international tax regime (ITR)—which is the set of conventions that
allocate the “right to levy tax” from commercial activities involving locations and/or
residents from more than one jurisdiction—should include allocation conventions that
compensate for those externalities by transferring wealth, in the form of taxing rights, to
developing countries. Accordingly, in the international context, the ITR should be
understood as a macro price-correction mechanism that relies on the volumes of trade
between given developed and developing countries as a proxy for the relational duties
between their peoples. I contextualize the analysis by briefly discussing how relationaldistributive duties impact the allocation of taxes between source and residence
jurisdictions—a core issue in international income taxation. I further point out that
analyzing relational-distributive duties bears crucial significance on the most important
ITR allocation challenge today—allocating income taxes derived from the activities of
MNEs.
An examination of both the legal-economic literature dealing with the ITR and the
liberal philosophy literature dealing with international distributive justice reform reveals
that with very few exceptions, 8 the underlying relationship between ITR arrangements
are non-rivalrous and non-excludable. Absent government action, these goods would go underprovided
because of individuals’ rational tendency to free ride. Rational individuals would therefore seek to
establish institutions that would assure the provision of these public goods through obligatory common
action.
8
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113
Harv. L. Rev. 1537 (2000); Brian Barry, Humanity and Justice in Global Perspective, in Ethics,
Economics, and the Law Nomos XXIV, 241-43, (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., XXXX).;
Alexander W. Cappelen, National and International Distributive Justice in Bilateral Tax Treaties, 56
Finanzarchiv 424 (1999 );Alexander W. Cappelen, The Moral Rationale for International Fiscal Law, 15
Ethics & International Affairs 97 (2001); Michael J. Graetz, Taxing International Income: Inadequate
Principles, Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 54 Tax L. Rev. 261 (2001); Charles R. Irish,
International Double Taxation Agreements and Income Taxation at Source, 23 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 292
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and different theories of global distributive justice has been largely neglected. Even
though the domestic tax policy literature and the philosophic literature dealing with
domestic redistribution identify the tax-and-spending system as the major redistributive
policy device, there is hardly any reference to the ITR as an option to promote global
wealth distribution. Normative theories’ failure to include international fiscal policy in
their analysis could be explained by the enormous complexity of tax laws.
Understanding ITR rules and conventions involves exceptionally high learning costs,
which are far less intuitive than the conventions underlying international trade law. Tax
scholars, on the other hand, find it difficult to engage in a normative discussion about the
ITR given the multiple standards of welfare and redistribution that could be employed. 9
The way in which the Article approaches the issue of global wealth distribution
deviates significantly from the traditional Cosmopolitan v. Statist debate. It provides a
normative framework that aligns well with prevalent moral intuitions that global
inequality and poverty in the developing world matter but do not prevail over duties to
compatriots. More importantly, even though it offers no resolution for the moral
dilemmas associated with the global distributive justice debate, it does offer a set of
normative and policy conclusions through which realistic solutions could be developed
and implemented. It does so within the boundaries of existing global political reality
where interaction among sovereign states is the underlying force shaping global order.
This allows policymakers to overcome the failure of current political philosophy
discourse to provide them with guidance. Moreover, rather than engaging in the Liberal
Cosmopolitan v. Statist debate, it urges philosophers and policymakers to establish a new
discourse to determine which attributes in global trade trigger relational-distributive
duties among peoples. Such a discourse is necessary to provide a baseline for any future
reform in the political structure governing international trade and the ITR.
Part II describes the current liberal Cosmopolitan-Statist debate on global
redistribution. Part III explains the concept of relational duties and Part IV delineates the
scope of the inquiry. Part V explains why international trade results in relational duties
between peoples living in developed and developing countries. Part VI then discusses
why the inability of the parties to address these relational duties invokes redistributive
political justice questions. Part VII offers the ITR as a viable mechanism to address these
relational duties, by briefly explaining its current operation and structure and by
analyzing how the “right to tax” should be allocated between developed (capitalexporting) and developing (capital-importing) countries. Finally, Part VIII offers several
brief conclusions.

II. The (Deadlocked) State of the Liberal Debate
The conflict between liberal cosmopolitanism, which stresses the importance of
global redistribution across-borders, and state-centered liberalism, which argues that
(1974); Nancy H. Kaufman, Fairness and the Taxation of International Income, 29 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus.
145 (1998).
9
Daniel N. Shaviro, Does More Sophisticated Mean Better? A Critique of Alternative Approaches to
Sourcing the Interest Expense of U.S. Multinationals, 54 Tax L. Rev. 353 (2001) (relating to the difficult
of making determinations about the appropriate welfare benchmark).
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wealth redistribution should be limited to the politically accountable unit of the nation
state, is decades old. Rather than exploring each of these positions in great depth, this
Article seeks to explain why no convincing theory has yet been able to reconcile these
opposing views. Independently, both Liberal-Cosmopolitanism and Liberal-Statism
approaches are appealing and intuitive in some respects, but they are also materially
deficient in others. The inability to bridge the two sides has incapacitated further
evolution of the debate. As a result, liberal political philosophy has not equipped
policymakers with the tools necessary to address global redistribution issues, even though
there is a general sense that global poverty and inequality are a source of moral concern.
Indeed, clarifying the normative debate over global redistribution is the most important
challenge faced by contemporary political philosophy today because it would allow
distributive justice considerations to influence the development of international and
supranational institutions.
A. Two Worlds on One Planet
Details over third world poverty and world inequality are readily available in the
information bombarded developed world. The details themselves, whether conveyed in
sensational coverage of dire human tragedies or statistical figures, are shocking—
revealing huge human suffering. 10 In 2005, about 40% of the worlds population lived on
below $2 per day, child mortality in Sub-Saharan countries was about thirty times higher
than in Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) countries
and maternity mortality rate is fifty times higher in the developing world than in the
developed world. 11 These statistics as well as many others, can only give us, the
privileged residents of the developed world, a vague idea of the pervasiveness of extreme
poverty and the imminent hardship associated with it.
That the above figures are (or at least should be) a source of moral discomfort to
well-off individuals in developed countries is fairly uncontested. Moreover, it is not
relevant to this analysis whether this moral discomfort originates from the fact that much
of the human suffering is a direct result of past injustices (e.g., colonization, slavery) or
that it could easily be avoided (e.g., infant mortality from preventable diseases), or
whether it stems from a “feeling” that all human beings are equal in some important ways
and should not be born into a life of misery. What is relevant, however, is that this moral
discomfort is widespread and real.

10

Shaohua Chen & Martin Ravallion, Absolute Poverty Measures for the Developing World, 1981-2004
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4211 at http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2007/04/16/000016406_200704161040
10/Rendered/PDF/wps4211.pdf.
11
All the data is collected from the web cite of the World Bank. The data reflects figures for the year 2005.
This means that the estimates do not reflect the potentially large impact of rising food and fuel prices in
recent year—which have most likely increased poverty measures in the developing world. See Who, et al.,
Maternal Mortality in 2005 16 (2007); World Bank, Data on Poverty and Inequality--Overview. at
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPOVERTY/EXTPA/0,,contentMDK:20153
855~menuPK:435040~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:430367,00.html.; World Bank, HNPstats.
at http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/ext/DDPQQ/member.do?method=getMembers..
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Human poverty is hardly new. In fact, in relative terms, it has declined during the
last decade. 12 The focus of this Article’s inquiry is the changes that have occurred in the
socio-political frameworks in which global poverty or inequality exist, and on the moral
impact of these changes.
The post-Cold War establishment of open and liberalized global markets appeared
to be the ultimate triumph of western ideology. It also created the impression, however,
that nation states may no longer be able to take care of their poor citizens when faced
with pressures of a world economy governed by strict neoliberal conventions.
This concern is aggravated by the fact that world markets operate at an
accelerated pace, as technological advancements allow people to transfer commodities,
capital, and information much more quickly and reliably than ever before. One aspect of
this advancement, that typically goes unnoticed, is that technological advancements have
also made it possible to effectively distribute commodity surpluses and wealth among
nations and peoples, perhaps for the first time in human history. Hence, the
unprecedented wealth produced by global markets highlights how little has been done (in
comparison to what could be done) to use this wealth to reduce human misery in the
developing world.
Nevertheless, the widespread moral discomfort with global poverty and inequality
has not resulted in any agreement as to how to mitigate them. The new technological
option of materially mitigating global poverty and inequality has, however, intensified
debates in contemporary liberal political philosophy about these issues. 13
Liberalism emerged from Kantian moral philosophy, which considers all
individuals as equal moral agents. In the political context, the notion of equal moral
worthiness prescribes that individuals should not be treated differently by political
institutions because of factors they do not control (e.g., gender, race) or attributes that are
part of their personal lives (e.g., religion, sexual orientation). Furthermore, in the second
half of the twentieth century, liberal philosophers have extended this idea to argue that
the notion of equal moral worthiness prescribes that individuals should not be put at a
relative disadvantage because of things beyond their control. 14 There is of course great
controversy over what comprises acts of will and what is pure luck, 15 and whether the
state should be responsible for offering equal opportunity or just sufficient opportunities
to all, 16 but the basic idea is relatively appealing and intuitive. From a liberal
perspective, individuals are equal moral agents, and they should be able to have a fair
opportunity to lead a meaningful and autonomous life regardless of the race, class and
religious groups they were born into. 17
12

World Bank, Data on Poverty and Inequality--Overview. at
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPOVERTY/EXTPA/0,,contentMDK:20153
855~menuPK:435040~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:430367,00.html.
13
As the references below reveal the vast majority of the literature dealing with this issue has been written
in the last ten years.
14
Anne L. Alstott, Equal Opportunity and Inheritance Taxation, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 469 476 (2007)
(providing a thoughtful summary of this literature); Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality Part 2: Equality of
Resources, 10 Philosophy and Public Affairs 283 (1981).
15
Id.
16
Harry Frankfurt, Equality as a Moral Idea, 98 Ethics 21 (1987).
17
Technically, nationality religion and even sex are mutable categories. However, de facto, for the vast
majority of humanity changing these categories is not really a viable option and therefore the Article will
treat these categories as immutable.
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In the context of this article, the debate over global distributive justice produced
two camps within liberal political philosophy: Cosmopolitanism and Statism.
B. Cosmopolitanism
Contemporary Liberal-Cosmopolitan philosophers argue that policymakers should
abandon current state-centered redistribution conceptions in favor of a more position that
does not distinguish among individuals by their nationality. 18 While these cosmopolitan
philosophers may be trailblazing vanguards or prisoners of their ivory-towers, their
monist claims— that the only units of moral concern are human beings, and that all
human beings are morally equal and should be treated accordingly 19 —are forceful and
deserve addressing.
Liberal-Cosmopolitans evaluate political institutions in accordance with how
promote those institutions regard all human beings. 20 This moral evaluation
encompasses two important stages marking the development of contemporary LiberalCosmopolitan philosophy, each of which was triggered by the works of the influential
philosopher John Rawls and the feeling among Liberal-Cosmopolitans that his works do
not sufficiently take into account issues of global inequality and poverty. In his landmark
book, “A Theory of Justice,” 21 Rawls reshaped liberal thought, claiming that the
operation of just institutions are those agreed upon by rational individuals positioned
behind the “veil of ignorance.” The veil of ignorance is a thought experiment—in which
individuals are thought to have no information whatsoever about their actual position, the
possible positions, and their probabilities. It is therefore a method designed to avoid any
particularity from shaping political institutions, and it relies on the reasoning of
hypothetical agents that are forced to be impartial by their ignorance. From this thought
experiment, Rawls derived his famous two general principles of justice—the liberty and
difference principles—which require the protection of basic liberties and the equitable
provision of five primary goods. 22 Although a deep analysis and critique of the Rawlsian
theory goes well beyond the scope of this inquiry, it is important to note that in “A
Theory of Justice,” Rawls constrains his principles of justice to the political unit of the
nation state and remains intentionally brief and vague as to why he does so. 23
The first stage of Liberal-Cosmopolitanism challenged this confinement of the
Rawlsian analysis to the nation state political unit. 24 Philosophers like Charles Beitz and
Thomas Pogge have claimed that the Rawlsian assumption that domestic political
institutions operate as a closed system that distributes fundamental rights and duties
conflicts with reality. In reality, individuals’ access to fundamental rights is also affected
18

Among the recent influential works of Liberal Cosmopolitans one can include: Thomas Pogge, World
Poverty and Human Rights, 19 Ethics & International Affairs 1 (2005); Kok-Chor Tan, Justice Without
Borders – Cosmopolitanism, Nationalism and Patriotism (2004 ).
19
Charles Beitz, Cosmopolitanism and Global Justice, 9 Journal of Ethics 11 (2005) ; Andrea
Sangiovanni, Global Justice, Reciprocity, and the State, 35 Philosophy & Public Affairs 3 (2007)
20
They do not (explicitly) tie the cosmopolitan ideal to the existence of a global state, however. See KokChor Tan, Justice Without Borders – Cosmopolitanism, Nationalism and Patriotism 5 (2004 ).
21
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 40-168 (1999)
22
Rawls defines the primary goods as goods “every rational person is presumed to want” whatever else he
wants, including liberty opportunities, wealth, income and the social bases for self respect. Id. at 54
23
Id. at 6-8
24
The constitutive works of Liberal Cosmopolitans at this stage are: Charles R. Beitz, Political Theory and
International Relations (1979); Thomas W. Pogge, Realizing Rawls (1989).

10

by the interactions among states, market forces, and international mechanisms over which
the state sometimes has little or no influence (e.g., supra-national institutions or
foreigners participating in the domestic economy as investors). 25 Accordingly, LiberalCosmopolitans argue that, to be faithful to its own principles, Rawls’s theory should
adhere to its liberal individualistic framework. This framework should disregard national
borders as no more than an arbitrary distinction and looks only at individuals. 26 Because
individuals are born into their nationality, their “national endowments” are morally
arbitrary and the veil of ignorance should extend so that rational agents making decisions
behind it would not be aware of them. If this was to happen, the Rawlsian framework
itself would prescribe that just political institutions would apply the two principles of
justice to all human beings. 27 This extension of Rawlsian distributive theory thus sets a
high universal standard and requires mass transfers of resources from developed to
developing countries.
The second stage in Liberal-Cosmopolitan thought emerged as a reaction to
Rawls’s later book—“The Law of Peoples” in which he explicitly addressed, and
rejected, an extension of his distributive theory to the international arena. Rawls
acknowledged that all individuals are entitled to have their basic humanitarian needs met,
especially in times of crises in which states may not be able to supply even minimally
acceptable levels of basic provisions. 28 These humanitarian-rescue duties that people
have towards other peoples, which he framed as “the duty of assistance,” differ from the
domestic distributive obligations triggered by inequality. In response, Pogge published a
collection of essays in which he re-articulated the notion of global redistribution duties, 29
which had a broader and more tangible appeal than the initial classical LiberalCosmopolitan argument. He argued that even from a minimalistic libertarian perspective,
peoples of developed nations have a duty not to harm those in developing nations. He
then demonstrated how existing international arrangements actually harm peoples of
developing countries. This includes anti-dumping arrangements, agricultural subsidies
and intellectual property regulatory regimes all which favor the interest of developed
countries at the expense of perpetuating the disadvantages and humanitarian deficits of
less-developed countries and reducing the welfare of their citizens. From an empirical
perspective, many of Pogge’s claims are counterfactual and have been persuasively
criticized as speculative. 30 Some of his other claims are, nevertheless, well established.
For example, the international legal system harms people of developing countries when
25
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protecting the resource and borrowing privileges of tyrant and corrupt governments and
holding the state liable to agreements made by those governments. The willingness of
Western governments and business entities to collaborate with these governments
constitutes a casual relation to the misery of the people of corrupt governments.
It is, however, difficult to draw a cause-and-effect connection between the
privileges of the developed countries and the actual harm they inflicted on developing
countries. 31 For example, should the citizens of the United States, Britain, Ireland, Israel,
and Finland all be considered as preventing or causing harm when the International
Monetary Fund (“IMF”) (along with other financial conglomerates) agreed to bail out
South Korea during the 1998 East Asia financial crisis but refused to do the same later
with Argentina? Should they be considered as harming peoples of developing countries
when western financial institutions lend money to developing countries, or when they
refuse to do so? Should they be considered as causing or preventing harm when those
banks forgive some, but not all, of the debt owed to them by developing countries (e.g.,
the case of Argentina)? These questions demonstrate how limited Pogge’s theory is in
providing guidelines to construct actual global redistributive policies. In other words,
Pogge’s ideas of rectification fail to provide any practical guidance as to how much
redistribution should there be, and more importantly, they do not help identify what
occurrences trigger a distributive duty.
Pogge made clear that he regarded his later proposal—that there is a minimal duty
not to harm—as a second-best alternative for explaining distributive duties. The best
alternative, in his opinion, was still the original argument: that the ultimate duty to
redistribute wealth from developed to developing nations is anchored in a positive duty to
account for the equal moral importance of individuals. 32 This duality in Pogge’s position
highlights the main contribution of his normative innovation. In his later work, Pogge
shifted the Liberal-Cosmopolitan ambition to avenues more compatible with individuals’
ordinary perceptions. Rather than advocating for an all-or-nothing solution—which
stresses complete moral equality between compatriots and foreigners—he emphasized the
presence of a preliminary duty not to harm other humans (or to compensate for the harm
one has inflicted). Focusing on the alleged harm inflicted by the current system on
peoples of developing countries, Pogge reframed the obligations towards them as
negative duties (duties not to harm) and, by doing so, appealed to a broader audience.
For Pogge, a devoted Liberal-Cosmopolitan, this reframing came at the cost of
significantly narrowing peoples’ duties to only include remedying casually linked
disadvantages. Therefore, he essentially adopted his second-best reality proposal:
peoples living in developed countries would not have to allocate resources to mitigate the
disadvantages they did not cause—no matter how devastating their consequences may be
(e.g., the AIDS epidemic in Africa). He, therefore, paved the way to a new non-utopian
philosophic discourse over global distributive justice issues that promotes arguments
other than the merits of complete and unconditional equality between foreigners and
31
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compatriots. Moreover, by trying to win broader appeal, Pogge opened a discourse that
takes into account common perceptions as a relevant consideration in the global
distributive justice moral debate.
For Liberal-Cosmopolitans, globalization did not change anything. It just made
the attempt to assign moral value to states more evidently absurd. Given the strong
commitment of liberal scholarship to notions of moral equality, impartiality, and
adequate opportunity to all—how can any liberal possibly differentiate between
individuals according to their nationality? How can a liberal political arrangement
possibly exclude itself from addressing tremendous human suffering and lack of
meaningful opportunities simply because it involves the bad fortune of individuals who
happened to be born in foreign nations?
The notion that moral equality gives rise to the belief that all humans are entitled
to some equal provision of certain basic goods cannot, however, be separated from the
question of what global political regime should enforce and supervise this provision.
Most Liberal-Cosmopolitans try to avoid linking the Liberal-Cosmopolitan ideal to the
global state concept. Even though they do not call to abolish states, they tend to remain
intentionally (and suspiciously) vague about the actual mechanism through which global
distribution should be enforced. This, undoubtedly, is Liberal-Cosmopolitanism’s
Achilles heel.
C. Statism
Liberal-Statists are at an inherent philosophic disadvantage when confronted with
Liberal-Cosmopolitans’ critique. Given the strong commitment of liberal thought for
moral equality, impartiality, and the right of all individuals for an opportunity to conduct
a meaningful life, how can one morally justify the political structure of nation states and
their bias towards compatriots?
Most Liberal-Statist philosophers would agree that a moral political structure
would have for account to foreigners’ common humanity. 33 They contend, however, that
common humanity can only justify wealth transfers and interventions on a rescue basis—
when foreigners suffer from absolute deprivation of human autonomy and dignity. This
common humanity is insufficient to trigger robust redistributive obligations aimed at
reducing relative deprivation caused by inequality, however. Liberal-Statists argue that
the existence of collaborative political institutions, which also have the coercive power to
force actions on their members, fundamentally alters the connection among individuals,
and that distributive justice claims only arise in the context of this unique association,
which is based on mutual commitment. 34 A detailed inquiry into the subtleties of the
above position is unnecessary, because all of us experience it on a daily basis; for
example, we are aware of famines, but endorse the political reality in which providing
costly medication to Medicaid recipients has priority over providing food to distant
foreigners.
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Thinking of nationality in terms of commitment is appealing but problematic.
Nationality is formalistic and, in most cases, an involuntary association. Why should an
American of Mexican descent living north of the Rio Grande be committed to help
finance wealth transfers and government services to American citizens that live on the
other side of the Mississippi River or the Atlantic Ocean? Would it not be more plausible
to assume a stronger commitment between this particular American citizen and her
Mexican neighbors on the south bank of the river?
Liberal-Statists have a multilayer reply to this critique. First, they point out that
in many instances national group memberships correlate relatively well with other group
memberships based on similar historic, ethnic, cultural and linguistic backgrounds.
Second, the notion that all individuals are entitled to certain universal rights does not
mean that the burden (of the positive duties) to assure those rights falls equally on all
human beings. 35 Any type of reasonable political theory would have to account for the
fact that individuals have stronger obligations towards others that have reciprocal
obligations towards them. Even though the act of entry into a nation is pure luck, once
membership is established, it is accompanied by reciprocal rights and obligations. Most
individuals live their lives in ways that suggest they accept that the reciprocal relationship
among them and their fellow compatriots carries significant moral weight.36 Regardless
of whether Liberal-Cosmopolitans regard this as right or wrong, this tendency of human
nature is something of which (non-utopian) political philosophy should take into account.
More importantly, despite the recent wave of globalization, world markets and the
international organizations that help coordinate and regulate their operations have not
come close to replacing the role of the state. Although this may change over time,
contemporary international markets and political settings do not exercise the same level
of control over individuals’ lives—they lack coercive power and have no effective
mechanism to directly assign personal claims or duties.
Each country has to take into consideration the policies of other governments but
is accountable to its own people; thus it determines by itself which policies it wants to
pursue. In this type of political setting, the attempt to establish a global safety net
through cross-national redistribution is bound to be ineffective and, in many cases, will
lead to politically absurd and unsustainable results. Two points stand out about
cooperative redistributive enterprises that are formulated and driven at the nation-state
level. First, to be effective, a redistributive enterprise requires cooperation among
participating governments and a minimal level of competence in governments receiving
aid. 37 Second, and more importantly, the notion of national self-government and
accountability is inconsistent with the ideals of cosmopolitan egalitarianism. 38 This is
because governments’ policies reflect, to a certain extent, the preferences of their
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peoples—so each people should bear the consequences of its policies. 39 Cosmopolitan
egalitarianism thus undermines national accountability because it requires people from
one political entity to transfer funds to other peoples, which are subject to political
institutions over which they have no influence.
The above concern is not a theoretical deficiency, but a fundamental practicalpolitical obstacle that makes any international redistribution inherently unsustainable.
For example, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Syria are countries in conflict with each other.
Assume, solely for the purpose of this example, that all three nations have democratically
elected governments that reflect their peoples' will. Any claim for cosmopolitan
distributive justice would require disregarding that conflict, and have Israel and Saudi
Arabia transfer funds to Syria, which is by far the poorest of the three countries. Even if
Syria would have been required to use these funds only to improve its provision of
healthcare services, the transfers from Israel and Saudi Arabia would still leave it with
more resources to better prepare for a future conflict with them. This is politically
unsustainable. No Israeli or Saudi government could agree or persuade their voters to
support such a redistributive scheme, and no Syrian government could ever have this
claim enforced. Significantly, this problem is inherent in any cosmopolitan redistributive
scheme; because money is fungible, it could not be corrected by having Israel and SaudiArabia make transfers to an international organization that would then allocate it to Syria
and other less-developed countries. Accordingly, if developed countries were forced to
make transfers to such an organization, the United States and the United Kingdom could
indirectly help countries such as North Korea, Belarus, and Zimbabwe. By doing so, they
would take off some of the economic burden from those governments and, in a sense,
indirectly subsidize their policies.
Liberal-Cosmopolitans may argue that (relatively) affluent Israelis have indeed
cosmopolitan duties of wealth redistribution to (relatively) poor Syrians. They would
probably concede, however, that Israelis are not required to transfer funds to Syrians but
would argue this does not mean that the cosmopolitan duties do not exist, but merely that
they are trumped by (national and personal) security considerations. 40 While there is no
controversy that, by the virtue of their common humanity, Syrians and Israelis owe
humanitarian duties to each other, 41 the notion that they have redistributive duties is not
only meaningless—because they currently can not be met—but also are counter-intuitive.
By the same token, those Liberal-Cosmopolitans would have to endorse that (relatively)
affluent American Jews had redistributive duties towards poor Germans in 1943, and that
(relatively) rich Tutsis living at Burundi had distributive duties towards poorer Hutus
living in the neighboring Rwanda during the 1994 genocide.
The above two, admittedly extreme and provocative, examples illustrate a deeper
point, however. Statists’ objection to global redistribution is deeply rooted in the well
established notion within contemporary liberal political philosophy that questions of
justice, and distributive justice, can only be meaningfully addressed in a beyond-crisis
39
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social setting. Only a society which assures a certain sustainable level of personal safety
and political stability, and where no large-scale conflict or famine exists, can “afford” to
develop just political institutions. 42 Accordingly, states’ sovereignty and accountability
to their own peoples undermine the notion of long term international stability, and,
indeed, the international arena has for many years been considered as a Hobbesian “State
of Nature.” 43 Although world history may, hopefully, be progressing to a much more
peaceful era, state sovereignty still imposes a challenge to cross border redistribution.
For example, Germans living in the West side of the Berlin wall probably felt very close
to those living on its east side, but mass redistribution between them became possible
only once the conflict between East and West Germany ended.
This example demonstrates why redistribution on the international level is very
different from domestic redistribution. Even in the case of countries like the United
States—which are comprised of fifty smaller semi-autonomous political units—federal
supervision helps to overcome problems of competence, cooperation and conflict. People
in Massachusetts may have very different opinions than those living in Texas, and this
may indeed lead them to structure their local and political affairs differently. However,
despite all their differences, wealthy individuals living in Massachusetts would likely be
much more willing to comply with a federal redistributive program benefiting poor
Texans than Israelis would be willing to comply with a program benefiting Syrians. It is
not only that Texas will not use this money to disadvantage Massachusetts in the same
way Syria may use it against Israel, but also that people in Massachusetts know that, at a
time of national crisis, Texans would be responsible for cooperating with them to
alleviate the source of the crisis. It is therefore apparent that humanity is not enough, and
that a long-term reciprocal commitment is required to trigger a viable political
distributive justice claim in a multi-state political reality.
Given the above, most Liberal-Statists would agree that the Liberal-Cosmopolitan
vision is a utopian ideal—desired, yet unachievable. In a world divided into different
national apparatuses, no cosmopolitan egalitarian scheme is possible. Many LiberalCosmopolitans would be forced to agree to this proposition, but would reply with another
quandary: what does it mean to be a liberal and to recognize that all human beings are of
equal moral worth if de facto significant numbers of human beings do not deserve any
material consideration because they are foreigners? If by the virtue of their humanity,
those foreigners are entitled to some rights that they are not receiving from their own
state, who has the duty to assure that these rights are provided? How can foreigners’
rights mean anything if no one has an effective correlative duty to assure it is provided?
How can a bias towards compatriots be reconciled with the Kantian position that all
humans are of equal moral worth? How can we justify the moral waste that occurs when
developed countries invest enormous amounts in their own citizens when it is much
cheaper to alleviate foreigners’ right deficiencies? 44
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D. Identifying the Problem: Global Poverty in the Crossroad of Two Conflicting Liberal
Intuitions
Rather than adding another argument to the Statist-Cosmopolitan debate, this
Article tries to identify the source of the controversy. It claims that the controversy
originates from the two conflicting intuitions that emerge out of liberal thought: the
intuition that rules should be impartial and the intuition that the liberal ideal could only
be reasonably achieved within the framework of the nation state, which is based on past
historic experience and analytical thinking. 45 As I explain below, these two intuitions are
key to understanding how political institutions and moral arguments are framed in liberal
democracies.
Modern liberal theory requires political arrangements to be just, so that all
rational individuals will agree to them. 46 This requires liberal arguments to be impartial.
Impartiality, as a methodological tool, validates the legitimacy of rules because it ensures
that their application is general and is not contingent on morally arbitrary factors (e.g.,
race, gender, religion). 47 For this reason, partiality is often considered as a proxy for
injustice, because individuals should be held accountable for their actions and, to a
certain degree, their preferences but should not be disadvantaged due to things beyond
their control. Thus, there is a strong bias in liberal thought against any distinction based
on endowment that is considered partial and unjust.
Even though liberalism is committed to impartiality, it also inherently relates to
the notion of democratic sovereignty. In liberalism, the premise that all humans carry
equal moral weight suggests that democracy, in which every person has an equal
opportunity to vote and influence public policy, is the practical political structure
according to which individuals’ claims from society and responsibilities to it should be
determined. There is also a historic connection between liberalism and democracy;
liberalism developed in Western Europe during roughly the same period that national
ideologies and nation-states developed there. 48 Thus, to date, democratic sovereignty has
only been effectively exercised within the nation-state’s political framework—that is,
only democratic nation-states have been able to execute policies that endorse liberal
values, e.g., legal regimes that protect human rights and tax-spending policies that
sponsor welfare state provisions. 49 In contrast, very few Liberal-Cosmopolitans argue
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that a world democracy would be an optimal arrangement—precisely because they fear
that these characteristics can only be achieved within nation-state frameworks. 50
The cleft between these intuitions is straightforward and inevitable because
nationality, like race, is in many ways an arbitrary category. When liberals restrict the
obligation for justice on the basis of nationality, they undertake a partial position based
on national endowment. 51 This partiality would have been morally insignificant in a
world in which every national entity was able to supply its members with an adequate set
of minimal resources to lead a meaningful autonomous life. 52 It has enormous
consequences, however, in our world, in which sovereigns vary considerably in their
capacity and willingness to provide for all of their citizens. In this world, partiality
towards compatriots means that developed countries primarily devote their resources to
promoting the welfare of poor living in them. This leaves the poor living in developing
countries—which is roughly half of the human race—in a heavily constrained position. 53
E. Why Deadlock?
Recognizing the sources of the conflict between liberal intuitions of impartiality
and national democratic sovereignty is more important than determining the
persuasiveness of the Liberal-Statist or Liberal-Cosmopolitan positions. The difficulty in
reconciling these two notions is crucial because it leads to a policy deadlock. This
conclusion may surprise some readers, given the unprecedented recent flourish of the
philosophic literature dealing with issues of global distributive justice and given that
political philosophy is not a field in which one would expect to find unanimous
concurrence.
The argument of a deadlock in the current political debate relates to the inability
of both the Liberal-Cosmopolitan and Liberal-Statist approaches to inform actual policies
related to current practices of international relations and commerce. Both sides offer
dichotomous arguments that are not only parallel to one another, but also to policymakers
who need to form these political institutions in a multi-state economically integrated
global arena.
For example, Statists like Nagel, may feel that the way current World Trade
Organization (“WTO”) trade liberalization initiatives exclude agriculture unfairly
disadvantages developing countries. However, given their State-centric position, they
would be unable to ground their criticism to any obligation which requires developed
countries to “give up” their superior bargaining positions to better promote the interests
of developing countries. Cosmopolitans would not be able to provide policymakers with
any guidance on how to design those political institutions as well. Obviously, from a
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cosmopolitan perspective, more distribution is better than no distribution, but
international institutions play only an instrumental role. There is nothing inherent in
trade or tax relationships requiring that cosmopolitan redistribution be promoted through
them. Cosmopolitans would thus agree on any type of redistributive scheme that would
be politically feasible and have the most redistributive outcome—whether it is lump-sum
payments between sovereigns, trade agreements or tying $100 bills to migrating birds.
The impact of the mismatch between the discourse of political philosophy and
what is actually at stake cannot be underestimated. Both approaches engage in
speculative normative theory—while remaining relatively mute about the evolving
institutional framework of international and supranational institutions. That both
approaches have so little to say about current policy issues suggests an ambition to
provide the perfect solution. In this type of discourse it is no wonder that many actual
issues associated with the construction of current arrangements fly under the radar of
moral-political scrutiny. Without undermining the role of ideal theory, the inability of
political philosophy to seize this window of opportunity to impact the actual construction
of global arrangements suggests a troubling deadlock.
This Article follows this conclusion of deadlock. Rather than embracing or
rejecting either the Liberal-Cosmopolitan or Liberal-Statist approach, it considers
whether there are other ways to approach global distributive issues and to tackle the
conflicting moral intuitions of impartiality and the necessity of the nation state.
III. Changing the Framework: From Impartial Justice to Relational Duties
This Article suggests a different approach through which the commitment of
peoples living in developed countries to those living in developing countries should be
examined. In presenting this approach, two additional concepts should first be carefully
explained and distinguished: impartial justice and relational duties. Impartial justice is
the set of claims and duties among certain group members, which are independent from
individuals’ actual relationships. Relational duties are partial and based on particular
obligations agents owe to those with whom they choose to associate. The framework of
this Article relies on a novel concept of relational distributive duties. To best understand
this concept, one has to carefully examine how it stands apart from the global distributive
justice debate reviewed in Part II.
A. Impartial Distributive Justice
I argue that the controversy between Liberal-Cosmopolitans and Liberal-Statists
should best be understood as a controversy about the scope of impartial distributive
justice. Standards of distributive justice are typically impartial in the sense that they
apply to all members of a designated group and do not depend upon the existence of
actual relationships among group members. These standards may require individuals to
transfer resources even to complete strangers. In the context of impartial distributive
justice, actual relationships do not weaken or strengthen the distributive duty or claim. 54
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Hence, the Liberal-Cosmopolitan-Statist controversy is about impartial
distributive justice because it centers on the question of which group justice
considerations should be imposed. Liberal-Statists consider the group of citizens or
residents to comprise the relevant group, while Liberal-Cosmopolitans argue that the
relevant group for redistributive concerns is the human race in its entirety. Put
differently, Liberal-Statist and Liberal-Cosmopolitans agree that distributive justice
claims and duties should equally be imposed on all group members; they just cannot
agree what the relevant group is.
The stagnated liberal debate over global distributive justice is by and large a result
of the implicit assumption that the proper standard is an impartial justice standard that
would be applied to an agreed upon group. The inadequacy of the current global
distributive justice debate suggests that a partial standard may offer some useful insights
as discussed below.
B. Relational (Partial) Distributive Duties
In contrast to an impartial framework for evaluating distributive justice, this
Article offers a new relational framework. While impartial-justice claims try to
determine what intrinsic attributes trigger distributive obligations among individuals, this
new framework tries both to determine what relational attributes trigger them and to
correlate the levels of distributive obligations with the nature and intensity of these
relationships. It also tries to elucidate whether (and which) voluntary relationships carry
with them any redistributive claims.
Unlike endowed relationships—e.g., relationships between compatriots—real
world relationships require actual connections among specific individuals and groups. 55
The rights and obligations emerging from these relationships are always agent-dependent,
and therefore partial, 56 because they require agents to prefer allocating their scarce
resources to those whom they chose to engage with. The relational framework thus seeks
to correlate levels of obligations among people with the nature of their relationships with
one another.
This notion of relational duties is intuitive and straightforward. 57 Individuals
associate different levels of obligations they owe other people according to the nature of
their relationships. The level of obligation may vary, but most people will probably agree
that I should have some special obligation towards my cousin, another soldier in my
(reserve) platoon unit, and a fellow member of my faculty—even if I am not especially
friendly with any of them. The questions of whether one possesses a right, and whether
that right is of the (stronger) negative nature of not to be harmed, or of (weaker) positive
nature to receive assistance, seem arbitrary and futile. For example, consider the question
of whether my brother and I have an “obligation” to treat each other respectfully. I claim
that most people would find the question irrelevant, given our binding long-term
relationship which requires us to act decently to each other. Additionally, if I talk to a
close friend with vicious sarcasm, how important is the question of whether I am
violating one of his negative rights (not to be harmed) or a positive right (to be treated
55
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with respect)? Consider also the situation of a small lifeboat filled with twenty strangers,
one of whom possesses all the food. 58 If that passenger decides to deny it from the
others, do the nineteen other passengers have any claim against the food-endowedpassenger who they have just met for the first time on the lifeboat? If they do, is the
food-endowed-passenger denying their negative or positive rights by denying them food?
The answer is that most people regard common philosophical classifications of
rights as futile—because the distinction among those amorphous categories tends to blur
in ongoing relationships. Moreover, these classifications have little to do with human
experience—especially in close settings. Human moral reaction tends to respond to the
fact that there are many potential agents that have duties to satisfy the rights of a specific
individual and that those obligations correlate with the intensity of the relationship and
the capacity of the duty holder.
A number of factors shape our moral intuitions about whether a certain
relationship raises relational duties. Relationships based on reciprocity and cooperation
trigger some sense of duty, even if entered into voluntarily. This is especially true when
these are long-term relationships with costly exit options. The special vulnerability of
one party may also establish a sense of moral duty in the other party. For example, a
professor may feel a different moral duty when interacting with another professor than
with an eighteen year old freshmen college student, even though legally they are both
adults. Sometimes, just the capacity to help, which may be determined by arbitrary
geographic proximity, is enough to trigger or to materially intensify a sense of duty
towards another party. Additionally, although arbitrary from an impartial-justice
philosophical perspective, people tend to form small interdependent relationships with
individuals with whom they share something in common. 59
It is important to point out that, so far, my argument has been modest in scope.
While I demonstrated that most people seem to recognize through their deeds the
existence of moral relational duties, I have not yet claimed that these relational duties
require any institutional response of the state or explain how they should relate to (nonrelational) impartial-justice duties in a world of scarce resources.
Relational duties are in fact typically recognized as an issue of ethics—the moral
values that should govern human behavior, which is different from the question of what
principles should govern the structure and operation of political institutions. The
philosophical inquiry of whether one can distinguish ethics from justice goes (well)
beyond the scope of this paper. 60 From a practical legal-perspective, it is important to
note that liberal legal regimes have a default presumption that favors freedom of
contracts, which essentially means that individuals are not subject to any exogenous
relational duties when voluntarily structuring their relationships. 61 This “voluntarist”
default is subject to many exceptions, however. Many branches of law in liberal states—
e.g., family law, labor law, consumer protection law and utility regulation—tend to
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intervene in long-term relationships with inherent high exit costs or when consistent
vulnerability of a certain party is observed.
Political philosophers tend to avoid the discourse of relational duties when
examining issues of justice. Relational duties require a bottom-up reconstructionalist
approach, which tries to elicit conclusions about moral behavior from observing and
comparing actual human practices. This differs from the impartial-justice top-down
analytical approach, which questions the morality of political institutions by making
assumptions and logically questioning their validity and implications. In the context of
relational duties, this reconstruction cannot yield any clear results about what duties are
owed through which relationships and, more importantly, how to divide the responsibility
to fulfill duties owed to a specific individual among a group of different agents with
whom he or she shares relationships.
The inherent ambiguity about the proper standards of relational duties could be
understood as the primary reason for why liberal political philosophy adheres to impartial
argumentation. As mentioned, impartial arguments establish general rules, which are
applicable to all. Because of that, even though it is unreasonable to reject the existence
and moral validity of relational duties, political philosophers tend to assert that general
normative duties of justice should be given priority over relational ones. Hence,
relational duties are integrated with universal duties, but they are considered secondary
and supplemental in nature.
This conception is well embedded in the practice of the liberal state. Even though
the state intervenes via regulation in many types of relations, the main re-allocation of
wealth is done through the state’s tax-spending mechanism. Therefore, even though I am
morally required to support my poor relatives, I am only allowed to do so while using my
after-tax money—meaning, after I have fulfilled the impartial distributive justice duties to
my compatriots.
IV. Limitations and Assumptions of the New Framework
Up to this point, this Article has primarily discussed the Liberal-Statist LiberalCosmopolitan debate and commented on the little progress that has been made to make
this debate relevant to actual decision-making about the design of international political
institutions. It has further explained the difference between impartial-justice claims,
which philosophers use to analyze the way political institutions should function, and
relational duties, which govern personal relationships. It now turns to combine two
distinct fields of thought: distributive political philosophy and international trade and tax
policymaking. Integrating the disciplines—so as to make normative theory more
applicable, and international trade and tax policy more just—is a challenge that requires a
new framework.
This framework requires separating the questions of what should be the proper
role of impartial justice and the question I address—whether in a multi-state reality
relational duties impact what people owe to one another, globally, and whether this
impact requires any institutional arrangement. This requires accepting the existence of
the multistate political structure, and that the current political structure of international
institutions is not able to support the Liberal-Cosmopolitan ideal. However, the approach
I propose does not directly draw on either the Liberal-Statist or Liberal-Cosmopolitan
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approaches. This allows both Liberal-Statist and Liberal-Cosmopolitan to consider the
Article’s approach without disposing of their respective positions.
A. A Realistically-Utopian Agenda
This Article asks how we should promote considerations of global distributive
justice within the existing multi-state political framework. Such a process requires a
normative institutional analysis, which reconsiders the operation of existing political
institutions.
This differs from other inquiries (e.g., Rawls’s “Theory of Justice”), which
commence by examining moral principles and then trying to conclude what a just society
should look like if it were designed from scratch. The main difference is that an
institutional analysis begins with reality and then acknowledges which parts of it to
embrace and which to challenge. This process requires deciding what the acceptable
limits of practical political considerations are, and to designate them as the boundaries of
the analysis. Because these boundaries depend on dynamic human practices, they are
inherently contestable. Thus, a normative theory that wishes to deal with and re-shape
reality must also explicitly address these boundaries. 62 This Article’s “realistic utopia”
adopts three assumptions, each of which I consider as straightforward and conservative—
though not beyond challenge. 63 The ambition of this Part is therefore not to engage in a
normative discussion about the desirability of the below assumptions, but to use these
quasi-descriptive assumptions as an Archimedean point to develop the realistically
utopian normative analysis.
The first assumption is that wide-scale global redistribution cannot be based on
principles of rectification. Correcting past harms is an appealing notion and is indeed
possible in a few clear-cut cases. 64 However, the complexity of human history 65 and the
difficulty of determining causality 66 make rectification an arduous and potentially
impossible task. As such, the attempt to integrate large-scale distributive considerations
into international institutions should not be based upon corrective justice.
This assumption, that real world justice entails synchronic rather than diachronic
justice, is crucial to the analysis. Developing countries such as Sierra-Leone, Rwanda
and Pakistan have no special claims against their former European colonialists—France,
Belgium, and the United Kingdom—asking them to correct the wrongs done to them.
Colonialism was anything but benevolent, but it is hard to determine whether it
positioned countries in a worse position than what they would have been absent it.
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Would peoples in the above countries have better or worst political institutions absent
colonialism? Would children mortality rates in those developing countries be higher or
lower?
Few people in the developed world realize that it cuts both ways, however.
Developed countries may not categorically reject distributive claims by arguing that they
directly result from developing countries’ inabilities to establish adequate political and
legal institutions. To be sure, questions of developing countries’ institutional competence
will bear significance on how to satisfy any distributive claims. However, to determine
whether these claims exist and their nature, the assumption that international distributive
justice does not involve corrective justice requires us to focus upon actual relationships
among peoples and look at actual measurements of poverty and inequality.
Second, this Article assumes that global institutions will not replace states in the
near future. Therefore, any suggestion for an institutional redistributive scheme should
take into account the existence of the multi-state multi-sovereign international arena.
Even though states would be increasingly influenced by other states, state-based political
institutions would retain the ability to determine most aspects of their tax-spending and
foreign relations policies. The implication of this assumption is that any LiberalCosmopolitan distributive scheme would not be able to overcome problems of
accountability and explicit conflicts between various sovereigns. This assumption also
presupposes that any stable global order will continue to depend on each nation-state’s
ability to provide legal, financial, and administrative infrastructures to support it. Hence,
in the absence of dominant supra-national or international players, cooperative efforts of
nation-states have the best chance of successfully establishing a sustainable scheme of
large scale cross-border redistribution.
This assumption is a factual one, and not a normative claim about the morality (or
immorality) of nation-states. 67 In other words, I do not assume that states “are just” but
merely that they “are.” I ask the reader to accept that states are currently the only
dominant players in global political arena, and that they are currently the only framework
in which schemes promoting notions of impartial distributive justice exist. The analysis
hereafter draws only on the existence of this state of affairs—and remains mute on the
question of whether it is morally just.
With the minor exception of the European Union, 68 recent history informs us that
peoples are reluctant to concede nation-state powers to global or international
institutions—possibly because they have bias preferences towards their compatriots, and
want political institutions that reflect them. 69 For example, Medicaid is a relatively
expensive domestic redistributive program that provides low-income compatriots with
costly health insurance. The argument that it is immoral to spend money on Medicaid
until all humanity has been guaranteed a certain minimum baseline of health coverage
would strike almost all residents of developed countries as wrong. Whether correct or
67
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not, these intuitions are strong and bound to shape political arrangements in the
foreseeable future.
The third assumption is that individuals care about foreigners’ human suffering
and violations of their rights. Even though individuals feel stronger sentiments towards
their compatriots, they do not categorically reject foreigners’ situations from their moral
concern. 70 This assumption suggests that even though institutional considerations of
democratic accountability may prevent liberal democracies from engaging in
cosmopolitan-egalitarian actions, 71 foreign policy of liberal democracies is not limited,
categorically, from addressing normative claims associated with foreigners’ needs and
suffering. Recent phenomena, such as the growing popularity of the fair trade movement
and of NGOs dealing with international development, 72 indicate the validity of this
assumption. These phenomena reflect that our contemporary social welfare function
should be modified to include the condition of foreigners in some way.
B. Integrating Relational Duties into International Political Arrangements
This Article argues that global trade may result in relational-distributive duties
between peoples. Unlike relational duties between individuals, these relational duties
require an institutional response, and international taxation may offer a plausible avenue
to facilitate such a response. A careful analysis is needed to clarify the scope of this
Article because questions of wealth redistribution are always complicated and
multilayered—especially when dealing with global redistribution. Hence, the Article
limits its analysis to address the following three types of questions:
1) What, if any, is the source of global distributive duty? Which considerations
give certain individuals the right to claim that other individuals living in a different
country should be morally obliged to transfer resources to them without any tangible
return?
2) Once the right of certain individuals has been identified, how should the
relative distributive burden be shared among those that are required to transfer some of
these resources?
3) What institutional scheme should govern those redistributive transfers?
In more concrete terms, the following Parts proceed by answering the following
three questions: Why (voluntary) international trade results in relational-distributive
duties between peoples; why these duties require a political response; and why the ITR
may be an appropriate institutional arrangement to accommodate these distributional
concerns.
Noteworthy, this Article does not discuss in depth the following questions
concerning global distributive justice:
1) What should be the “currency” of justice? There is strong disagreement among
scholars about what should be a proper benchmark to measure and remedy disadvantages
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that require distributive justice considerations. Scholars have suggested a number of such
“currencies”—including opportunities, 73 primary goods, 74 and capabilities. 75
2) How much should be contributed in order to satisfy the distributive claim?
Does the answer to this question depend on the situation of the potential receiver of the
transfer, or on the capacity of the transferors to sacrifice? This question may have an
additional aspect to it, which is how is the distributive duty of an agent affected by the
non-compliance of another agent? 76
These latter two questions are typically related to the (first) question of the source
of the redistributive duty but are not inherently part of this Article’s core inquiry, which
is concerned with the source of the global distributive duty and the institutional
framework through which it could be realized. 77 However, the Article contends that the
answer to these questions of currency and depth of global redistribution should be made
with reference to the capabilities literature—as advanced by Martha Nussbaum and
Amartya Sen. 78
The integration of relational duties into global political institutions offers a
promising avenue for achieving real-world progress on issues of global wealth
redistribution. The introduction of this new framework requires briefly elaborating upon
the relationships between relational-duties and impartial justice claims. The framework I
propose neither nullifies nor affirms the moral desirability of the Liberal-Statists or
Liberal-Cosmopolitan justice ideals. I do not discuss the role of relational duties in the
intra-state context at all. In the international context, I argue that relational duties exist in
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parallel to questions of whether impartial-justice claims should be validated. Simply
put, even though this Article focuses upon relational duties, it acknowledges that other
(cosmopolitan or humanitarian) duties may arise in the international context.
It is clear that relational-distributive duties among peoples matter more when
institutions promoting impartial-justice do not exist. However, even if those institutions
did exist, relational duties would still be important because there is a potential political
tradeoff between how broad the group of right holders is and the amount of rights
allocated. If impartial-justice concerns are going to be implemented on a broad global
basis, the political reality dictates that there would be pressures to provide only the very
minimum to every person. Education and health are essential services, but “good”
education and healthcare require funding that goes well beyond “the minimum” provided
by the impartial global justice guarantee. It is therefore easy to see how relational duties
may still be of potential significance even if there is a political structure that guarantees a
certain minimum to all human beings.
For example, let us assume that I have a relational duty to help my brother when
he is sick. I argue that this duty is independent from whether we live in a country that
provides universal health insurance to all its citizens. Obviously, my relational duty
would be affected by the health benefits provided by the state as part of its impartial
justice commitment to its citizens. If my brother and I live in a state with no universal
health insurance, my duty to him may be substantial. However, if my brother needs more
assistance than provided by the state, I would have a relational duty towards him even if
we lived in Sweden, which has a generous and universal state-funded health system.
In the same way that my brother’s entitlement for state health benefits impacts but
does not categorically eliminate my relational duties to him, a cosmopolitan regime
would not eliminate relational duties among peoples. Relational duties are, therefore, an
independent source of moral duty and not a second-best instrumentalist way of promoting
an, otherwise utopian, cosmopolitan ideal.
V. Distributive Relational Duties and International Trade
Although the process of globalization may not have brought peoples to a state of
interdependence that justifies Liberal-Cosmopolitan impartial-justice claims,
international trade is a type of relationship that in certain cases gives rise to distributive
moral duties. Even though participation in this enterprise is mostly voluntary—and
therefore assumingly beneficial to all parties—the allocation of benefits arising from the
interaction between the advantaged and the disadvantaged is morally contestable.
Peoples living in developed countries benefit from the disadvantages and low bargaining
powers of peoples from developing countries. 79 While the former enjoy unprecedented
high standards of living, the majority of the latter suffers from inhuman labor conditions
and can barely attain basic health care, education, and decent living standards.
People have some obligations, such as fair business conduct, towards others to
which they are connected through trade relationships. In the context of a world
characterized by extreme inequality, affluence, and poverty, these fairness duties have a
broader scope that includes redistributive considerations. These redistributive
considerations are less stringent than domestic redistributive duties. I argue, therefore,
that even though United-States citizens have distributive duties towards fellow
79
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disadvantaged compatriots, they also have some (less stringent) distributive duties to
foreigners. Simply put, I owe more to the people serving in my army and washing the
dishes at my nearby restaurant than I owe to persons in China manufacturing my shoes
and to farmers in Brazil raising my coffee. However, I also have some distributive
duties towards the foreigners I am indirectly engaged with through trade. These
redistributive duties are triggered by our continuously growing interaction with each
other as repeated players in the joint economic enterprise of international trade.
To establish the above claim, I first discuss how the phenomenon of
“globalization” has placed peoples in a joint economic system. I then show that even
though international trade is voluntary, it may give rise to relational duties when market
transactions are not fair transactions, and when the parties benefiting from this unfairness
have the capacity to remedy it.
A. Globalization as Proximity
The growing intensity of global trade and the growing penetration of global
markets have essentially connected people through economic relationships, which once
were limited to the domestic state. Fifty years ago, most individuals’ economic relations
were within the boundaries of their locality or domestic state. In today’s world,
individuals are still likely to have a dominant set of domestic affiliations, but also equally
likely to have multiple other affiliations. International trade essentially brings people
“closer” together by connecting them in ways that once were limited to close geographic
settings.
Proximity has been widely recognized as a source of special duty. 80 From a
relational duties perspective, proximity is a proxy for the existence of meaningful
relationships. Individuals are more likely to share an interdependent long-term
relationship with their neighbors and colleagues than with distant strangers.
Globalization thus challenges the value of geographic proximity in a world with
developed global financial and commodity markets. Distance-wise, peoples are not
anymore closer today than what they were in the Middle Ages; however, global economic
liberalization positions them now as parties to long-term trade relationships. Through
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this relationship, formerly discrete economies have now been drawn “materially closer”
to each other. 81
In essence, globalization is the accelerated mobility of assets and ideas within
new integrated and interconnected market settings that transcend the nation-state.
Although commerce among nations is not a new phenomenon, globalization has created
an unprecedented level of economic interconnectedness among peoples. Massive flows
of direct and portfolio cross-border investments, which once were fairly rare, are now
made on a daily basis, 82 and many businesses depend on foreign suppliers, customers and
service providers.
Nation-states’ regulatory gap exemplifies the extent to which market integration
has changed our economic relationships. Democratic sovereignty entails that people
should be able to determine certain aspects of their lives through an egalitarian process of
political participation. However, global markets have created certain regulatory
problems, making it difficult to effectively regulate some major issues on the state level,
because both the markets affecting those issues and the agents participating in those
markets have become global. These issues include vital economic issues such as
environmental concerns over global warming and the stability of financial markets. 83
Globalization’s pervasiveness may be best reflected in the recent food and financial
crises. For example, the growing demand for oil and food products by the growing
economies of China and India, and the decision of the United States government to
reduce its dependency on oil by encouraging the use of corn for ethanol, have resulted in
severe food insecurity and social turmoil in parts of the developing world. 84 This
example does not suggest that the current food crisis is “the fault” of the United-States or
any other country. It does suggest that given the interconnectedness of global markets,
the attempt to relegate the meaningful economic relationships that give rise to relational
duties only to the domestic or local spheres is somewhat artificial and obsolete. 85
Like domestic market settings, global market settings are not neutral but political
and require intensive cooperation. Countries typically seek this cooperation through legal
and political devices—mainly treaties and international institutions—that enforce
contractual and property rights. Accordingly, international markets do not operate in a
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vacuum but within a well developed set of legal and coordination norms. 86 Moreover,
the ideology driving the recent flourish of global trade is also anything but neutral. It
stresses that the key to increasing human welfare is economic growth achieved through
stable adherence to free trade and liberalized economic structure. 87
The most visible aspect of the novel interconnectedness between peoples is the
emergence of international institutions and agents. Whether an MNE, a multi-national or
international governance institution, an advocacy group, or an NGO—these cross-border
agents organize to meet their goals in ways that challenge our nation-centric conceptions.
Here, I focus on two key international agents: international institutions that coordinate
rules related to economic activities and MNEs.
The norms, rules and principles governing the operations of international
institutions like the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO are the common carrier of global
trade. These Western-dominated institutions coordinate international trade through a
bundle of norms and proceedings, which serves two important functions. First, it
standardizes many aspects of international trade by providing a set of coordination norms
that reduce the transaction and uncertainty costs of cross-border investments. These
criteria allow international trade to operate as a global public good through a grid that
allows interaction and efficient allocation of resources, thus yielding non-exclusive and
non-rival benefits that increase as more parties interact through it. International
organizations determine the criteria and supervise their enforcement—mainly through
reporting but also through arbitration procedures.
These functions highlight the second role of international institutions: being the
gatekeepers of access to the public good of international trade. Although each sovereign
nation’s compliance with the criteria set by these institutions is voluntary, countries
wishing to benefit from international trade must de facto accept all of the conditions set
by international institutions. Hence, when the IMF and the WTO delineate their rules,
they are actually delineating the costs of access to international trade and investment
markets. In a global economy, in which peoples’ welfare has become so dependent on
international trade, non-compliance with those rules becomes merely a remote and formal
possibility for many sovereigns, no matter how controversial these rules may be. 88 For
example, in response to the third world debt crisis during the 1980s, the U.S. Treasury,
the IMF and the World Bank devised a set of conditions to developing countries seeking
aid known as the Washington consensus. 89 Some of these conditions reflected sound
policy, which was of direct interest to the IMF and other international lenders (e.g., fiscal
discipline). Other conditions, however, reflected a strong neo-liberal bias, and could
therefore be seen as an ideologically skewed interference in the internal policies of
developing countries (e.g., an emphasis on requirements for trade liberalization,
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privatization, and deregulation). Viewed wholly, the process of rulemaking and normsetting has far reached beyond the original purpose of coordination. It has become a
process that allows international institutions to reformulate the economic design of
sovereigns. 90
MNEs offer a different challenge to nation-centric conceptions. In the past half
century, the number and reach of MNEs expanded dramatically and now control
enormous economic and investment powers. By employing economies of scope and
scale, which allow them to reduce collective costs and utilize intangible-assets efficiently,
MNEs are the crown jewel of modern economic integration. They command the lion’s
share of Foreign Direct Investments (“FDIs”) and conduct much of the high profile R&D
and manufacturing activities considered essential to technological advancement and
economic growth. Operating in multiple jurisdictions, MNEs are huge generators of
economic activity and, in a sense, have become de facto setters of standard business
behavior. At the same time in which MNEs affirmed their strong position in global
economy, their affiliation to specific national jurisdictions gradually weakens. For
example, MNEs’ nationally diversified shareholders, operations, employees and
consumers have made it difficult to analytically identify any specific MNE with a
specific nation. 91 MNEs therefore demonstrate that the regulatory gap, in which
standard-setting economic powers lie, are beyond sovereigns’ control. 92 *
The above observations avoid either criticizing or embracing the current global
order and the way it facilitates international trade and investment. They do suggest,
however, that looking at international trade as either a “natural” development or as a set
of sporadic and unrelated transactions is wrong and misleading. International trade
performs in a market that, like any other domestic market, is a product of a political
construct that governs the rules through which agents interact. Even the decision not to
try to subordinate different aspects of global markets to any single sovereign is a political
decision from which some benefit while others lose. 93
As a result of this political decision-making, global markets have become
structured networks of long-term interdependent relationships that require political
cooperation. The cooperation we see today amounts to an economic association. A
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country’s membership in this association has significant implications on its economic
structure and on its citizens’ lives. These implications, to be sure, are still far less
invasive in comparison to the power states exercise over their citizens. However, given
the high exit (or non-entrance) costs of this association, it is reasonable to expect that
some moral relational duties should exist between its participants. When a coal mine
collapses in China because of inadequate safety measures, is it only the responsibility of
the Chinese government that set lax regulatory requirements or is it also the moral
responsibility of the high-ranking employees and investors of the MNE that owns it, or of
the MNEs that purchase its cheap product? If a shoe company employs children in
sweatshop conditions in Indonesia, is it only the Indonesian government’s moral
responsibility to alleviate these conditions or is it also the responsibility of the company’s
shareholders, top-management employees and consumers?
International trade connects peoples together in ways that once were confined to
domestic settings. These types of relationships in the domestic setting are often a source
of special relational duties and responsibilities. It is widely recognized that optimal
business strategies, growth, and innovation require abandoning obsolete nation-centric
conceptions. By the same token, the global economy’s interconnectedness requires us to
examine our relational duties through a global-cross-border perspective and not to limit
them to the domestic sphere.
B. Which Type of Economic Relationships Give Rise to Relational Duties
That international trade allows people in different countries to connect despite the
geographic distance does not explain why international trade connections result in
relational-distributive duties. My answer is that current international trade exhibits a
disturbing pattern, which gives rise to relational duties. This conclusion means that the
voluntary nature of trade transactions is not enough to vindicate them as fair. This
requires close scrutiny, after all, parties are assumingly rational; therefore, they engage in
global trade only if they benefit from it. While this may be true, peoples living in
developed countries benefit from it unevenly. This skewed allocation of benefits is not a
coincidence but a direct result of the vulnerability of peoples living in developing
countries. In addition, there are two other factors that—even though they are not
necessarily unfair themselves—exacerbate the immorality of this pattern: the inability of
developing countries to exercise effective control over the rules governing global trade
and developed countries’ (unfulfilled) capacity to better assist developing countries.
Coupled together, this gives residents of the developed countries an unfair advantage—
and results in a situation where the market equilibrium is arguably not always a fair one.
Before proceeding, it is important to stress two points. First, my argument is
distinguished from the Liberal-Cosmopolitan position, which argues that international
settings are sufficiently like domestic ones. Instead, I focus on the actual attributes of
international trade relationships and claim that many of them are unfair and give rise to
distributive duties. To be precise, I do not yet argue that these relational duties should
trigger an institutional response (a task that Part VI focuses on), but only that they exist in
certain international trade relationships.
Second, as Part III.B. establishes, the claim that individuals may have certain
obligations to those they interact with draws upon a rich philosophic literature of ethics.
Not everyone agrees that ongoing interaction among individuals can result in relational
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duties, but this is a fairly well established field of thought in moral philosophy and a one
which most (non-economists) seem to intuitively accept and act upon. The previous
Subpart established why in an integrated global market consideration about relational
duties should not categorically be limited to operate solely within the framework of the
state. This Subpart, takes the argument a step further and asserts that the current practice
of international trade between developed and developing countries exhibits an unfair
pattern that triggers relational duties.
Trying to precisely define an “unfair pattern” is as futile as the attempts to define
tax avoidance or pornography. Nevertheless, like tax avoidance and pornography, we
cannot offer a comprehensive definition of it but we “know it when we see it.” 94 This
article tries to go beyond the “know it when we see it” test and single out a number of
factors that characterize the mainstream cases of unfair patterns. Accordingly the analysis
below highlights the main attributes of transactional unfairness and addresses only those
relatively stronger cases of unfairness in which all the attributes apply. Nevertheless,
this approach implicitly assumes some overlapping consensus for what unfairness is, and
therefore is suitable to address only clear cut cases rather than those at the margins. 95
Generally, we may define transactional unfairness as a situation in which a party
utilizes a disadvantage of a counterparty to seek self-serving benefits at the expense of
another party in a way that is legal but immoral. 96 The immorality of the behavior raises
a relational duty to amend it (so that it is no longer unfair) or to compensate the exploited
party in other ways. 97 The problem with this type of inquiry is that any voluntary market
transaction is generally assumed to be profitable to all parties. The claim that one party
generated excessive or unfair returns must rely on a hypothetical benchmark of an
alternative transaction with different allocative outcomes—a benchmark that in most
cases simply does not exist. 98 Accordingly, rather than providing a full theory of
transactional fairness, this inquiry can only enumerate a number of factors that seem to
indicate the existence of unfair advantage in the context of international trade. To
distinguish between fair and unfair voluntary trade transactions, this Article focuses on
objective indicators.
The first factor needed to demonstrate an unfair advantage is that individuals in
developed countries benefit from global inequality and poverty in developing countries.
Benefiting from a comparative advantage is the essence of trade, however, so this factor
is usually satisfied. Hence, to prove the existence of a relational duty, it is necessary to
first explain why trading with Indonesia, which has comparative advantages in low wages
and low safety regulations, is different from trading with Finland, which offers a
comparative advantage in high human capital (particularly electric engineering expertise).
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Obviously, the existence of the benefit factor alone is not enough to prove
unfairness. The second factor, therefore, is that trade results in relational duties when the
allocation of benefits is skewed. Hence, even though both parties fare better than if they
had not entered the transaction, one party yields the lion share of those benefits. 99
The outcome that may suggest an unfair pattern is when one party, typically the
party supplying cheap labor or scarce natural resources, trades a lot of its resources in
exchange for a level of compensation that does not allow it much more than survival.
Granted, like any other political theory that tries to determine sufficiency standards in our
dynamic world, 100 it is difficult to draw the line between what is mere survival and what
is an option for a decent life. 101 Nevertheless, it seems relatively straightforward to argue
that if a party at full employment cannot afford food, shelter, and security, as well as,
minimal health care and primary education services necessary to support a family, they
have not reached a decent standard of living. 102 This is a somewhat minimalist and
simplistic definition of decency, but I adopt it here to minimize controversy on this point
because it is a relatively conservative definition.
To make my definition even more conservative, I further assume that to indicate
an unfair allocation of benefits, the party-alleged-as-exploiter should be able to attain a
decent living standard, even without the transaction. This is somewhat of a
simplification, since one can imagine a more nuanced situation in which the unfair
allocation exists between two parties that do not attain a decent standard of living or
between two parties that both achieve such a decent standard. However, this assumption
suffices for the purpose of this analysis, which is concerned with examining clear-cut
cases of relational duties that arise from international trade relationships, and not with
providing a comprehensive theory of transactional fairness.
Demonstrating the outcome factor of unequal benefits of a trading relationship is
a necessary but not sufficient indicator for an unfair trade pattern. The core of the
distinction between “fair” and “unfair” lies in the unequal bargaining position and one
party’s capability to transform the other party’s vulnerability to a business advantage. 103
This is the exact opposite of neo-classical economics. Rather than looking at the United
States-Indonesia relationship only as a manifestation of the comparative advantage
principle, it argues that the American investors and consumers are exploiting a
comparative weakness of individuals living in Indonesia. Hence, to avoid overriding the
moral validity of all commercial relationships, we must have a clear idea of what counts
as vulnerability. Put differently, I am not denying that U.S. trade with Indonesia meets
the Pareto efficiency principle but argue that Pareto improvement is not always enough to
validate the fairness of a transaction.
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To substantiate the above claim, it is necessary to distinguish incidents where
benefiting from a comparative disadvantage of the counterparty amounts to an unfair
advantage. Observing mainstream human conduct suggests that vulnerability has an
important role in determining relational obligations. 104 Voluntary market transactions are
not always perceived as fair when one party suffers from an endowed disadvantage (in
relative and absolute terms), which significantly reduces its bargaining power when enter
potential market transactions. 105 Disadvantaged parties are de facto forced to entering
long-term economic relationships even though their market returns do not provide for
decent lives because they simply do not have any acceptable alternatives.106 This type of
disadvantage is of particular concern when it is not something the disadvantaged can
directly control and when it perpetually reduces or slows down their ability to attain a
decent life through market participation.
When a party’s profit comes primarily from the other party’s ongoing misfortune,
this behavior tends to be seen as unfair. Unfortunately, human history is full of examples
of these types of behaviors. These can range from extreme scenarios—e.g., some Polish
and Lithuanian individuals that extracted huge amount of resources from ghettoimprisoned starving Jews in return for basic food products during WWII 107 —to
contemporary “everyday” occurrences where American employers take advantage of
their employees’ illegal immigration status to deny them basic labor rights and
employment conditions. 108 The Lithuanian and, even more so, the Polish people, did not
imprison the Jews in the ghetto, since they were also subject to an involuntary occupation
by Natzi-Germany. 109 In the same way American employers could not be held directly
responsible to the poverty that led illegal immigrants to come to the United States.
Nevertheless, even though the non-vulnerable parties described did not directly
contribute to the vulnerability of the other parties, the transactions were “voluntary” and
the disadvantaged parties would be worse off if the transaction had not occurred, we
regard their behaviors of as exploitive and morally faulty. We resent non-disadvantaged
parties from selfishly utilizing their comparative advantage in these scenarios because it
is based on their counterparties’ misfortune and suffering.
This point merits more attention. While it is clear that human beings resent those
who take advantage of the vulnerable, this resentment may not be justified normatively.
There seems to be a sound case that if redistribution towards the vulnerable is deemed
desirable by society, then society as a whole should bear the cost and responsibilities of
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this redistribution. 110 Such arrangement would arguably be more efficient than the
distortion of market transactions. 111 To argue that there is a normative need for relational
duties, one has to provide more than a knee jerk reaction to explain why voluntary
transactions in which parties take full advantage of their counterparties’ vulnerability are
unfair and normatively undesirable.
There are a number of possible responses to this challenge. First, if there is a
strong and consistent observation that the vast majority of people perceive a certain
transaction as morally faulty, the discussion of why relational duties should protect
vulnerable parties may not be necessary. Since we are dealing with an actual human
society, the fact that something may overwhelmingly seem wrong may suffice to raise
relational duties. For example, let us assume a society where a large portion of the
population considers it wrong for people to work at bakeries for more than ten hours per
day or sixty hours per week because of the hard labor it involves. In such a society,
bakery owners may have a relational duty not to take advantage of the low bargaining
powers of their vulnerable employees to “overwork” them. Even though vulnerable
employees’ low alternative employment possibilities would compel them to work more
than what is considered reasonable in that society, employers may have a relational duty
not to take advantage of this vulnerability. This argument is a positive reflection about
the state of affairs in a given society, and not so much a normative argument.
Nevertheless, it makes sense that in a society which has cohesive norms, relational-duties
that follow those norms would be an integral part of how this society operates.
The second response relies on the positive assumption that vulnerabilities cannot
be sufficiently reduced by market mechanisms, by actions of social agents (such as state
sponsored welfare institutions), or by voluntary actions of private parties. 112 This, in fact,
assumes that a certain degree of uncompensated vulnerability is an inherent part of
human society. In this state of affairs, it would be counterproductive to strip private
parties from any duty to protect the vulnerable, because such a stripping would give those
parties socially undesirable incentives to exploit these vulnerabilities. Without relational
duties all duties to protect the vulnerable would be relegated to social agents such as the
state. Without relational duties, private parties and communities would have the
incentive (and social legitimacy) to maximize their wealth by exploiting the comparative
disadvantage of the vulnerable even though they know that there is no real other
protection available to them. Thus, in the absence of relational duties, the ultimate goal
of providing more protection to the vulnerable may be severely undermined. For
example, let us assume a society that seeks to protect individuals that because of social
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and genetic endowment were not able to obtain a good education. Among other things,
this protection would allow these vulnerable individuals to make well informed decisions
about sophisticated mortgage products. In this society, mortgage sellers should have
relational duties to adequately explain the different contracts they are selling to potential
“unsophisticated” consumers. Otherwise, the social goal of protecting this vulnerable
group would not be adequately met.
The third response is, in a sense, a combination of the two former ones. This
argument states that the absence of relational duties to protect the vulnerable would result
in negative expressive value externalities. In a given society, where as a positive matter
there is a goal of protecting the vulnerable, it is inconceivable to have private parties and
communities engage in exploiting their vulnerability. Such exploitation would project a
vision of society that does not care of the vulnerable and would thus have negative
externalities upon intangible social fabrics—e.g., trust, solidarity and human
compassion—which are necessary for a well-ordered functioning society. This is a very
strong argument because it explains not only why private parties may have relational
duties but also why they should not be compensated by social agents when they incur
costs to meet those duties. For example, let us assume a society which values racial
equality. In this society, employers may have a relational duty not to discriminate against
minority group members. Given the strong social stand against discrimination, it would
also be unreasonable to compensate employers that hire employees that come from
minority groups. Even if such a reimbursement was administratively possible, it would
project a vision that minority group members are indeed different and inferior.
The above three justifications for relational duties stress what all of us know from
our daily lives’ experiences—that as a matter of ethics, and not necessarily as a matter of
law, we are all required not to take full advantage of others’ vulnerability. We therefore
should be able to characterize a Pareto-efficient transaction as unfair if it involves a
vulnerable party who is not able to attend a basic minimum decent living standard, and
when the benefits are unevenly skewed towards a party that is able to live above that
standard (even without the benefits that the transaction with the vulnerable party confers
it with).
Providing a full list of potential vulnerabilities is beyond the scope of this Article.
However, in the context of international trade, a few important ones should be mentioned,
including: food insecurity, acute financial insecurity, lack of relevant expertise or
information, and the inability to cope with an effective cartel or monopoly arrangement.
Even though not all people living in developing countries suffer from these types of
endowed disadvantages and not all people living in developed countries are immune from
them, people living in developing countries are much more likely to suffer from these
disadvantages.
The conclusions of the above analysis may seem counterintuitive to many living
in developed countries. After all, the prevalent perceptions are that people living in
developing countries that are “taking our jobs,” are getting “higher relative returns” and
using “our money.” All these statements are true to some extent, but they do not change
the fundamental point that I have stressed—that upon interacting with peoples that are
materially disadvantaged (in both absolute and relative senses), we need to put some
moral constraints on our ability to seek self serving profits. The voluntary nature of the
transaction and the fact that those people would fare worse in its absence are not,
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therefore, materially important. To produce cheaply, many individuals working in
developing countries work in harsh and unsafe labor environments. Given a viable
ability to earn their living in a different way, most individuals would choose not to work
in these places, but they are pushed to do so by their poverty. We take advantage of their
poverty in ways that we would regard as immoral if they were to happen in the closer
domestic setting. For example, very few will contend that the following Pareto-efficient
transactions are moral: buying a kidney from a compulsive gambler who will lose all of
the money, or denying basic work safety conditions from employees that enter the
country illegally. In short, human beings tend to regard a transaction as immoral when a
party with desperate need receives very low returns when performing an unsafe or
degrading task. We do not need a comprehensive definition of transactional fairness to
know the above transactions are not fair, and, by the same token, we do not need such a
definition of fairness to see that our trade relationship with peoples in developing
countries may not be fair.
It is worth examining how this analysis applies to international trade in concrete
terms. It is, I believe, not controversial to see how global inequality translates to
developed countries’ privilege. 113 Poverty’s low standards of living and low levels of
human capital formation in developing countries result in low wages, lax regulatory
enforcement, and under-priced natural resources—all designed to attract foreign
investments. These factors result in higher purchasing power in developed countries and
in higher yields to investments made (primarily) by their residents. 114
Developing countries and people living in them strive for foreign investment and
cannot afford to reject certain investments and certain jobs. The vulnerability and low
bargaining powers of developing countries dictate that certain types of economic
activities with high long-term negative externalities are shifted to them. Businesses
associated with these externalities include pollution-intensive industries and businesses
that benefit from low labor standards—e.g., gender based exploitation of young women,
and lax safety regulation in dangerous workplaces.
Strong economic growth, however, is rapidly mitigating some of these
disadvantages in certain countries—but not in all of them. Even in countries with robust
growth figures (e.g., China and India) where market forces increasingly provide this
change, a majority of people are still unable to attain basic health care services, adequate
primary education, and basic services (e.g., running water). Many developing countries
in Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa and South America are far from reaching a state were the
majority of the population attains a decent life style and many of them (including the
majority in China and India) will not reach it in the next decade or so. This means that
even though economic growth allows for tremendous progress, child mortality from
preventable diseases would probably continue to be very high in all these countries, at
least in the next ten years. Furthermore, given the low educational infrastructures in
many of these emerging economies, new generations of young adults are entering the
113

Jan Nederveen Pieterse, Global Inequality: Bringing Politics Back In, 23 Third World Quarterly 1023
(2002)
114
Charles R. Beitz, Justice and International Relations, 4 Philosophy & Public Affairs 360 (1975);
Thomas Pogge, Severe Poverty as a Violation of Negative Duties, 19 Ethics & International Affairs 55
(2005). For a contrasting view see Mathias Risse, How Does the Global Order Harm the Poor? , 33
Philosophy and Public Affairs 349 (2005).

38

global labor market with little prospects of attaining anything more than low-skilled lowwage jobs. Although market forces are pushing towards a convergence in living
standards across the globe, this process of convergence is simply too slow given the dire
need. The “radical inequality” between developed and developing countries therefore
helps to maintain somewhat of a vicious cycle. 115 Regardless of whether one thinks that
this is the responsibility of developing countries, it is important to recognize that in this
cycle are individuals from the developing world that participate in global trade with few
chances to realize a genuine opportunity for a decent life.
Three elements intensify the immoral nature of this pattern. First, the dominance
of developed countries in the institutions governing global trade has resulted in many
examples in which trade arrangements favor developed countries. 116 The most wellknown incident of this is the agricultural exception in trade agreements. 117 The
international trade regime encourages the liberalization of services and commodity
markets pushing countries to reduce their trade barriers and liberalize their import and
export markets. However, this same regime that promotes liberalization also specifically
allows countries to protect (through tariffs and subsidies) their domestic agricultural
producers. This exception is primarily made to shelter the agricultural sector in
developed countries from competing with foreign imports from developing countries. 118
Conspiracy arguments that the IMF, WTO, and OECD operate as a cartel to
advance the interests of developed countries and theories of capture are exaggerated. 119
However, the fact that many developing countries have little influence on these
institutions and are primarily rule-takers is undisputed. Certain international institutions
dominated by developed countries can therefore materially and non-reciprocally
influence the economic structure of developing countries. Given the public good
characteristics of the global trade and the difficulty of exiting its “voluntary”
arrangements, this regulation without representation is morally disturbing. Global trade
rules entangle peoples in developing countries in path-dependent arrangements without
ever giving them any substantive voice to influence those rules. 120
Second, the growing capacity of developed countries to reduce global inequality
and poverty’s most devastating effects contributes to the moral discomfort created by
international trade. 121 As mentioned, the relatively modern phenomenon of enhanced
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economic growth has only recently enabled the majority of individuals in developed
countries to attain enough surpluses over what is required for them to pursue decent lives.
Hence, even though a more egalitarian distribution of resources was always a theoretical
option, for the first time in human history, the majority in developed countries can retain
a decent standard of living even if they “give up” some of their comparative advantages.
Third, the awareness in developed countries of issues of global poverty and
inequality does not allow us to ignore these issues anymore. Global trade is ancient, but
electronic media and international NGOs have only recently made the information about
the consequences of global poverty and inequality so readily available to the general
public.
The analysis of this Section should not be interpreted to suggest that specific
parties should not engage in cross-border trade transactions because they are unfair. In
fact, in a competitive market, parties do not have the privilege to engage only in fair
transactions. Neither the potentially exploited party nor the potential exploiter has any
ability to influence the economic equilibrium, even if they regard it to be an unfair one.
In the context of international trade and investments, firms increasing their costs in order
to provide higher-than-market returns to parties in developing countries would be driven
out of business given their lower competitive yields.
C. Relational-Distributive-Justice and the Coffee We Drink
The above argument suggests that international trade entails some unfair patterns,
which may therefore result in relational obligations. It further implies that in a
competitive market, correcting unfair patterns cannot be assigned to private agents.
An example may help to illustrate this point. Coffee is an agricultural product
raised in many developing countries. For simplicity, let us assume that coffee is a
standard commodity with no significant quality variations. Let us further assume a
scenario in which the average price of coffee to end consumers in the developed world is
$5 per pound, while the coffee farmers sell it in an average price of 5¢ per pound. The
return that the farmers receive for their crops allows them to attain only subsistence level.
The price variation reflects, of course, no malice. Coffee could be grown in
almost every developing country with a tropical climate; therefore, there is a high
potential supply of it. In many of these countries, agriculture is the only/main possible
source of employment because of the low human capital resources and the lack of
industrial infrastructure. Hence, a competitive market is bound to reduce the returns of
coffee farmers to subsistence levels. Under the assumption that the retail coffee markets
in developed countries are competitive, the difference of $4.95 per pound between the
price paid by the coffee distributors to the farmers and the price paid by the end
consumers reflects the real costs born by the coffee industry (e.g., transportation,
advertisement, etc.).
Let us further assume that the vast majority of the individuals from developed
countries operating in this industry (as investors, consumers and/or employees of firms in
the coffee trade business) enjoy an above-decent lifestyle. Many would think that the
price paid to the coffee farmers is “unfair” because if they were paid 20¢ per pound
instead of 5¢ (4% rather than 1% of the retail price), the farmers’ living standards would
rise dramatically—enabling them to attain basic goods such as good education for their
children and better health care services (that would further allow them to reduce the
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number of mortalities caused by preventable diseases). If such a uniform price increase
would occur, the price to the end coffee consumer would increase by no more than 3%.
If the demand for coffee is not completely elastic, and coffee is not completely
interchangeable with other products such as tea, this change should not significantly
affect coffee sales. Additionally, most individuals from developed countries operating in
the coffee industry will retain their high living standards.
True as the above may be, an individual coffee importer cannot buy the coffee
from its producers in any more than 5¢ per pound. Given coffee’s homogeneity, and the
market returns requested by everyone working in the coffee processing and distributing
industry, such an importer would be out of business because of its higher costs. In reality
as in theory, the global competitive market benefits the end consumer. Indeed, in the last
decades we have witnessed how international trade contributed to an excessive and
unprecedented increase in the consumption power and living standards of residents in the
developed world. These excessive (and one can even say infra-marginal) gains to end
consumers in the developed world align with the intuition that the benefits of
international trade are in many cases unfairly skewed.
Liberal-Cosmopolitans will find this example troubling. Why do people in the
coffee industry owe anything to the coffee farmers and not to the farmers’ neighbor—a
barber—who just by coincidence does not take part in the coffee trade? This objection
overlooks a point made earlier that relational duties exist in parallel to whether one
agrees that there is any Liberal-Cosmopolitan duty. 122 People in the coffee industry may
have special relational duties towards coffee farmers even if all humans (barbers and
farmers alike) would have been granted a certain minimum by a Liberal-Cosmopolitan
political arrangement.
A somewhat different response is that Liberal-Cosmopolitans’ farmers v. barbers
challenge misses the essence of the relational duties’ argument. Barbers, as well as other
service providers, could be seen as part of the coffee-farming community. Members in
this community are working hard to supply consumers in developed countries with the
products they desire. While the coffee-farming community fares better with foreign trade
than without it, its members are still far from having a “decent” living standard, which
they could attain if their developed-world counterparts were willing to sacrifice a very
small component of their profits. The relevant question therefore is not what is the
difference between the farmer and the barber, but whether our benefit from the extreme
poverty of the coffee-farming community, and this community’s dependency on us,
increase our moral obligations towards its members.
This example serves two purposes: First, it demonstrates that there could be a
relatively broad agreement that certain “ordinary” international market settings are
“unfair” even if it is difficult to perfectly define transactional fairness. This perceived
unfairness demonstrates that relational distributive concerns may play an important
corrective role in voluntary international market settings. Second, it suggests that in a
competitive market, distributive relational obligations entail a collective-action problem.
This is a structural problem, and addressing it requires the formation of a mandatory
mechanism to overcome it because competitive pressures disable private agents from
remedying it themselves.
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VI. Institutionalizing Relational Duties
Up to this point, this Article established that relational duties exist and that some
features of international trade exhibit unfair patterns breach those relational duties. It
also demonstrated that it is impossible to address these types of problems on an
individual level. Here, I will explain why, in the context of international trade, relational
duties should give rise to redistributive justice claims. Rather than affecting our
individual behaviors, relational duties arising from international trade should affect the
structure of the international or supra-national political institutions governing trade.
Accordingly, even though the relational duties are duties individuals owe to one another,
the settlement of these claims and duties, on the international level, should be made
among countries.
A. Close Relationships Over Long Distances and the Common Action Problem
Increasing competitiveness in global markets makes it impossible for individuals
to meet their relational duties. In particular, the physical distance and the overwhelming
number of relationships we are indirectly exposed to make it impossible for us to
prioritize our duties towards those we do not personally know. Therefore, even if we
recognize that the global economy occasionally facilitates unfair trade relationships
among individuals from developed and developing countries, we cannot satisfy our duties
merely by changing our personal conduct. This is a classic common-action problem,
which should be settled by enforcing a comprehensive, involuntary standard of
institutional intervention to help parties meet their duties without being placed at a
competitive disadvantage.
As mentioned, the notion of relational obligations that correlate with actual, (at
least partly), voluntary relationships is evident in the context of our familial, social, work,
and community-based relationships. For example, interpersonal intimate relationships
between adults may be subject to moral criticism, but only in extreme cases—e.g.,
polygamy, doctor-patient and teacher-student relationships—they require, involuntary
state regulation. Our challenge is to explain why essentially the same relational duties
have radically different implications in the interpersonal and international trade settings.
The key answer to this challenge is that distance and scale change our ability to
respond to relational duties. 123 International trade exposes us to a wide network of
relationships with a lot of individuals—some of whom suffer from acute disadvantages.
Even though trade draws people closer, geographic distance and division of labor in
modern economic markets make it impossible to trace those disadvantages. Individuals
cannot be expected to undertake costly information-finding and analyzing of expenses to
determine their actual relationships and the best way of fulfilling their relational
obligations toward distant individuals. This difficulty makes it implausible for a single
party to undertake the task of determining and prioritizing among different relational
obligations, and thus prevents them from taking actions to meet those obligations.
Just as in the case of individuals, peoples will compete for resources. In an
insufficiently regulated social structure, this competition may lead to immoral actions. 124
Current international trade relies primarily on parties’ ability to advance their position
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through free contractual bargaining, 125 and is therefore inappropriate to address the
problem of unfair relationships between developed and developing countries. 126 Given
this inability, international institutions need to internalize these negative moral
externalities of global trade. Since this is a systemic problem, and not a problem that can
be corrected effectively through reasonable changes in the conduct of individual parties,
it becomes an issue of justice. Global regulation of relational duties is therefore required
not only to improve the standard of living in developing countries, but also, and perhaps
primarily, to help peoples of the developed world remedy the immoral consequences of
their occasionally unfair competitive engagement in global trade arrangements. 127
It should not surprise us that socio-political institutions are needed to set a
standard that helps individuals in the developed world satisfy their relational duties. Part
V.A established that trade relationships among peoples have created a complex social
construct based on economic associations. The operational goals and structure of this
enterprise may differ substantially from those of the domestic state, but both are sociopolitical constructs. Our domestic experience indicates that coordinating behaviors in
such complex social settings requires establishing political institutions that use formal
legal devices. 128 Obviously, these legal devices are crude mechanisms that help us
satisfy relational obligations only through proxies. However, there are likely no other
viable alternatives.
In Part IV.A, I assumed that states will remain the major tax and spending entities
in the foreseeable future. From this, I concluded that any major future global
redistribution would have to be executed by states. This of course is a refutable
assumption, and we may eventually witness other actors—perhaps multinational NGOs
such as OXFAM which rely on voluntary giving or regional associations such as the
European and African Unions—evolve to better take such a role. However, no paradigm
has yet offered a viable alternative for an effective international regime that does not rely
on state action. Accordingly, in the context of relational duties resulting from crossborder trade, it is useful to think of a state as an aggregate of its citizens’ relational
duties. 129
This conclusion should not be surprising. The argument advanced is not that, as
an ontological matter, states are an aggregate of their citizen’s duties. Rather I assert that
if one accepts the relational distributive analysis, then in the world we live in, where
states are necessary to promote any large scale redistribution among peoples,
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policymakers should think of the state construct as a way to meet the relational duties of
their citizens. This is a modest claim, which aligns well with the institutional analysis
scope of the Article, which seeks to examine how existing real-world institutions should
operate justly.
To be sure, global trade is not new; neither are the unfair and exploitive practices
associated with it. The world has witnessed rapidly growing volumes of international
trade since the early days of imperialism, which was bluntly oppressive and exploitive
towards the developing world. However, in the days of colonization it was easy to
determine relational duties because members of one nation (the colonizers) were directly
exploiting members of another one (the colonized). Even though these duties were
hardly ever met, it was easy as a normative matter to determine the obligation. The
current situation of economic integration and interrelatedness among different countries’
economies diffuses this chain of responsibility. As a result, we witness a web of
international relations, which allows all developed countries to benefit from the
vulnerabilities of developing countries but does not hold any of them responsible for that.
This diffusion of responsibilities and the inability of private parties or state actors to uncoordinately act against it is the essence of the common action problem which this
proposal seeks to address.
Determining the actual duties that states have towards others states should be
made with reference to the following factors: their relative economic positions in terms of
per-capita GNP (to indicate their relative inequality), their poverty measurements, and the
volume of trade. The poverty and inequality measurements between two trading
countries offer a proxy for the potential existence of unfair relationships between the
peoples. For example, an unfair relationship is likely to exist between two countries
when one has a GNP per-capita in the top quintile (in terms of total human population)
and the latter has a GNP per-capita in the bottom quintile. To provide further support for
unfair trade relationships, it would have to be shown that the average income in the lessdeveloped country does not allow for a decent standard of living. By using an average
GNP figure, this mechanism assures that relational distributive claims would not be
triggered towards countries with high poverty rates that result from unequal intra-nation
wealth distributions. 130
After the standards for inequality and poverty have been determined, the existence
of an actual relationship and the level of this relationship should be assessed. The volume
of trade serves this function by indicating the intensity of the relational duties. 131 The
130
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relative volume of trade that specific developed countries have with a disadvantaged
developing country could also be used to determine the relative burden that each country
should have in fulfilling those duties.
The above suggestion is just one example of a possible metric that could help
establish the existence of relational duties among peoples. In the example I gave, this
metric relies on crude GNP measurements, because GNP is a relatively familiar and well
established concept. There are other indicators, however, which are perhaps superior to
GNP. 132 The factors it sets forward are dynamic and should be revised periodically—so
that when the economic positions of two countries converge (whether because the poor
country gets richer or vice versa), and the disparity in their bargaining positions is
assumingly mitigated, their relational duties would be reduced and eventually eliminated.
The Article’s suggestion, that some dynamic factors should be used in international
agreements, is not new, and such dynamic factors do indeed play an important role in
fundamental international agreements. 133 There are other variations and alternative
metrics that nation-states could use to measure the relational-distributive duties and
claims of their peoples. This Article does not claim there is only one metric through
which relational duties could be met, but that establishing international and supranational
institutions that promote considerations of relational distributive obligations is the
affirmative duty of sovereigns.
The notion that international and supra-national political institutions should be
modified to correct systemic problems is not very controversial. It builds on a body of
literature in liberal thought stressing individuals’ duty to establish just institutions, 134
especially when concerns over protecting the vulnerable are involved. 135
Once a systemic injustice is recognized, establishing just institutions to correct it
is necessary to reduce the injustice by setting a common standard with which all people
should comply. This common standard helps achieve two goals. First, it makes it easier
to determine that everyone is contributing at least their fair share—which, as in the case
of any common action, helps to deter free rider incidents. 136 Second, it sets a benchmark
for what different parties “owe” to each other and relieves them from the constant need to
ameliorate injustices for which they are not directly responsible.
132
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B. Understanding the Difference between Brazil and Bhutan
The argument that relational duties are a source of global distributive claims
differs from the more traditional impartial-justice Liberal-Cosmopolitan argument
because it bases redistributive relational claims on actual trade relationships. By basing
these claims on an actual relationship, it recognizes that in a world with multiple
sovereigns, basing cross-border redistribution on impartial factors is unsustainable. It is
also more intuitive than the Liberal-Cosmopolitan argument because it does not classify
the primary allegiance individuals feel towards their compatriots as immoral.
To illustrate this point, let us take four countries: the United States, Botswana,
Brazil, and Bhutan. Of the four, the United States is the richest country, in the sense that
it has the highest per-capita GNP. 137 Botswana is a poor country. However, because of
its relatively small population, democratic government, and huge diamond resources, all
of its citizens have access to reasonable health and education services. Brazil and
Bhutan are also poor countries, but many of their citizens do not enjoy minimally
acceptable levels of subsistence. In these two countries the largest causes of mortality are
preventable diseases such as dysentery; there is also no comprehensive children
immunization program, illiteracy rates are high, and many families face food and shelter
insecurity.
The United States has some degree of commercial relationships with Botswana
and practically no such relationships with Bhutan. On the other hand, the United States
has extensive commercial and diplomatic relationships with Brazil. American
corporations are heavily invested in Brazil, and American shareholders have yielded
substantial profits on their Brazilian investments over the years. Brazilian businesses use
intellectual property developed in the United States, and a lot of Brazilian manufactured
and agricultural goods are sold in U.S. markets.
According to Liberal-Cosmopolitan notions of impartial distributive justice,
because all human beings require equal moral consideration and/or because the United
States shares the same economic system with the other three countries, it is required to
transfer funds to them. Pogge’s modified “do no harm” Liberal-Cosmopolitan argument
would claim that the international economic order harms the poor countries, and the
United States should compensate them for that harm. Under the Liberal-Cosmopolitan
approaches, Americans should provide the other three peoples with a similar and equal
moral respect and resources so that all individuals in them may have a chance to lead
meaningful (decent) lives. It is important to recognize that Liberal-Cosmopolitans may
realize that they need to compromise and as a result allow American citizens to exhibit a
distributional preference towards their compatriots. However, the American citizens
would not be allowed to prefer Brazilians over the Bhutanese as long as the levels of
poverty in both countries are the same. The major difficulty with Pogge’s “do no harm”
argument is that it is difficult to establish actual reasons for why Americans should be
considered as harming Bhutan or Botswana—countries with which they have very little
contact.
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Liberal-Statists such as Rawls claim that the United States has no obligation
towards any of these countries other than in cases of acute humanitarian crises. If
earthquakes hit Bhutan, Botswana, and Brazil, the United States is equally obliged to help
all of them. Unless such a devastating occurrence happens, American citizens have the
same non-duty relationship with poor Brazilians as they do with poor people in Bhutan.
They should have no special duty to Brazilians raising their coffee, and have no
responsibility if, as a result of the decision to subsidize corn for the purpose of producing
ethanol in the United States, many poor Brazilian families experience food insecurity.
The fact that the Brazilian economy is connected to the American economy, and rather
dependent on it, does not strengthen or weaken Brazil’s plea for American help;
therefore, it is in exactly the same position as Bhutan.
Unlike the other approaches, the relational-distributive obligations I propose, the
commercial relationships between Americans and Bhutanese are insignificant, so
Americans may have humanitarian duties towards Bhutanese, but not relational duties.
The case of Botswana is slightly more complicated, because its citizens may not qualify
as poor in an absolute sense, and their commercial relationships with American are not
very intensive. Accordingly, if one adopts the position that relational duties should only
exist for those that qualify as poor, it is reasonable to expect that Americans do not hold
any relational duties towards the people living in Botswana. If one adopts a continuum
approach, it may be argued that the United States has to account for some, relatively
weak, relational duties that Americans owe to people living in Botswana.
Under the relational duties framework, Americans have major distributive
obligations towards Brazilians. Brazil’s poverty and unequal position suggest that there
is a high probability for unfair exchanges between the two peoples; the high volume of
trade between them suggests, moreover, that their relationship is very strong. The
relational duty framework uses trade relationships between countries as a proxy for the
relational duties between their peoples. Therefore, since the United States and Brazil are
currently the best representatives of their peoples, there should be a direct correlation
between those factors and the wealth transfers from the United States to Brazil.
Assume that apart from the United States, Brazil has extensive commercial
relationships with Portugal, Britain, and France. In this case the burden of meeting the
relational-distributive duties towards Brazil should be allocated among these four
countries according to two factors: their actual volumes of trade with Brazil and their
capacity to help it. Even though in all four of the above-mentioned countries, the vast
majority of people enjoy an above-decent living standard, there are great differences
between Portugal and the United States, the latter commanding much more wealth and
having a greater capacity to help.
C. Some Final Remarks
The above proposal may raise some concerns. First, the existence of a collective
action problem, which makes it difficult to impose faire trade practices, reduces but does
not necessarily nullify the possibility for fair conduct. Some companies may actually be
engaging in those practices today. Therefore shifting the responsibility to the state level
may reduce the “demand” for private fair conduct. This may absolve existing practices,
and be less accurate because states are only crude proxies to the level of their peoples’
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implication in international trade. 138 The response to this concern is that adopting the
above notion would impact the behavior of private parties (although one can imagine
other scenarios), 139 but that this is true for any type of state and regulatory actions.
Government action is therefore justified only if the common action is so severe that
curtailing it would yield more beneficial results then just leaving it to the preferences of
private parties. Policymakers face this problem all the time—more welfare results in less
charity, and setting state standards on environmental and safety issues may lower the
actual practices of certain businesses. In the above discussion I have demonstrated why
the common action problem associated with the competitiveness and interrelatedness
disables parties from effectively addressing the issue of fair practices. In this setting,
private actions can only be sporadic, anecdotal, and motivated by public relation
concerns 140 —so that the benefits that stem from any potential state action would likely
compensate for any reduction in those practices.
Second, the Article’s argument implicitly assumes that governments are
benevolent and competent agents serving their peoples’ interests. This, unfortunately, is
not the case with many governments in developing countries that suffer from weak
institutions, low expertise, and corruption. 141 It is, however, important to recognize that
this is a general problem with any transfer to such countries, and not only with the
redistributive transfers. For example, when the United States and its residents enter into
oil production contracts with countries like Angola or Nigeria, they in effect support
corrupt governments. Very little of this oil money is invested in the people of those
countries, some of it finds its way to private bank accounts in Switzerland and some of it
is actually used to oppress opposition groups in those countries. Therefore, the problem
of what corrupted governments do with money they should invest on behalf of their
citizens is broader than the issue of redistributive payments. In the context of
redistributive payments, there are actually some solutions that can help to partly
overcome some of these problems. 142 However, given the need to limit its scope, the
paper will not address any of them in details.
Third, some may regard this idea of relational-distributive duties as too limited.
Many of the least-developed countries (e.g., many sub-Saharan countries, East Timor,
Bangladesh) are so disadvantaged that they do not have any external trade relationships
with developed countries. Therefore, countries with the most dire need for external
resources would not benefit from this framework.
The above concerns are valid. The advantage of the relational distributive
framework over the Liberal-Cosmopolitan ideal lies not in its comprehensive coverage,
138
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however. The advantage of the relational setting is that it rejects the idea that crossborder transfers of wealth are a form of charity and establishes, instead, a system of
entitlements backed by concrete duties that address how the redistributive burden should
be systematically and fairly allocated. It relies on the premise that even though human
relationships may in many cases be a product of coincidence, 143 they are not morally
arbitrary. It achieves all this while avoiding the Liberal-Cosmopolitan absurdity, which
requires the United States to distribute funds to Bhutan and North Korea, thus putting
forward a claim for redistributive justice that could not be met in the absence of a world
government.
The relational duty theory is not a Liberal-Cosmopolitan impartial-justice theory
because it does not try to eliminate the role of luck and coincidence. Instead, it relies on
intuitive notions that taking unfair advantage of the vulnerable is immoral and, most
importantly, that people have greater responsibility to those distant peoples with which
they have actual economic relationships. 144 It also incorporates some notion of
impartiality, because it determines distributive obligations in accordance with objective
indicators. For example, the United States may disagree with some policies executed by
the Mexican or Chinese governments. However, as long as there are commercial trade
relationships with them, the United States must ensure that Americans’ relationaldistributive duties towards the people of Mexico and China are met.
This Article began by explaining that liberal thinkers avoid making partial claims
because they perceive moral arguments based on actual human interactions as less
ambitious. They identify partial arguments as trying to change individual conduct rather
than the conduct of political institutions and the universal rules according to which they
operate. 145 Here, I have demonstrated that this is not necessarily the case, and that
relational duties—which impose a systemic problem—can and should be translated to
impartial political claims over issues of global wealth redistribution and serve to reform
international institutions. Combined together, my relational framework claims that it is
immoral to ignore the interests of all foreigners but allows sovereigns to discount the
interests of foreigners in comparison with those of compatriots. Furthermore, it offers an
impartial way in which the interests of foreigners should be prioritized and addressed by
developed countries in a way that aligns with common political intuitions; it argues that
people owe more to those that they are closely connected with and who depend upon
them. And, further, individuals’ relational duties depend on both their capacity to help
and on the other party’s actual level of disadvantage.
Finally, in a somewhat similar vain, there is a valid concern that by imposing
duties on transactions with developing countries we would provide residents of
developed countries a disincentive to engage in trade relationship with them. The first
response to this is that every voluntary transaction results in a welfare surplus. When
dealing with a vulnerable party, the non-vulnerable party is not required to give up their
surplus, and not even to reduce it to the level in which they would be indifferent to doing
143
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the transaction with a non-vulnerable party, but just to allocate it more evenly.
Accordingly, if the relational duties are imposed uniformly, there would still be benefits
in buying coffee at developing countries rather than trying to produce it in developed
countries, because the developing countries have some factors (e.g., sun and cheap labor)
that make it cheaper to produce coffee. Relational duties would not eliminate the surplus,
they would just allocate it so that the coffee farmers, and not just the Starbucks
customers, would be able to attain basic health and education services for their children.
The second response is that there are ways to recognize those duties without imposing
any penalties on those individuals and business in the developed world that directly
engage in trade with the developing world. The below analysis demonstrates how
international tax policy could be designed to take account of such duties without
imposing direct penalties on private parties engaged in cross border transactions.
VII. Potential Policy Implications
Until now, this Article has dealt only with the source of the duty for redistribution
in a world economy comprised of people living in separate nation-states, which are
connected through (intensive) trade relationships. It has introduced a novel conception of
a relational global distributive duty, but did not indicate a specific institutional
arrangement through which this duty should be fulfilled. These relational-distributive
duties could be met in many ways—lump sum transfers among states, global labor safety
regulations, and anti-child labor initiatives— to name only a few examples.
Here I want to demonstrate how the ITR could be made to promote relationaldistributive duties. I suggest that even though we think of the tax system as a way to
primarily promote domestic distributional outcomes, international tax arrangements also
offer a promising avenue through which relational-distributive claims could be met. The
ITR is the set of norms and soft law rules through which countries divide the rights to tax
cross-border economic activities. 146 Accordingly, it assumes the existence of states and
the existence of trade relationships among them, which are the cornerstone assumptions
of the relational-distributive duties analysis. Since the ITR mirrors the international trade
regime, the tax relationships between countries can serve to correct the relational claims
arising from their trade relationships. Instead of regulating trade and investments, ITR
conventions can require developed countries to transfer some of their taxing rights to
developing countries, thus addressing relational duties by serving as an indirect macro
price-correction mechanism. Startlingly, even though the ITR deals with allocating
taxing rights between nations, global redistributive considerations play little (if any) role
in policy and scholarly debates about the ITR. Although explaining the ITR’s structure
in depth is impossible within the framework of this Article, I briefly explain how
relational duties should affect a number of core income tax arrangements.
Tax distributive arrangements provide effective mechanisms and do not require
extensive on-the-ground cooperation of foreign countries’ enforcement branches such as
other alternatives. However, one does not have to subscribe to the notion that tax
practices are categorically more effective to accept my argument. The skeptic reader
should agree that given doubts about the effectiveness of direct trade regulation,
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policymakers should be willing to consider using the ITR to meet relational-distributive
duties of their peoples—so as not to put all the eggs in the same basket. 147
A. Using International Taxation to Promote Relational-Distributive Duties
The ITR has several distinctive features. 148 Primarily, it requires an economic
relationship that could be taxed by two nation states—meaning the existence of
transactions that are subject to tax under the laws of more than one country. Only present
economic relationships trigger ITR analysis, and it only takes into account taxes levied by
nation-states—not by state and local governments. Hence, once a transaction has been
identified as a potential tax subject of more than one jurisdiction, the distribution of these
tax rights is regulated by ITR conventions. 149 The ITR deals with these taxing rights
conflicts through a set of soft law principles embedded in domestic tax legislation and
bilateral double taxation treaties. 150 Double taxation treaties are contractual
arrangements that countries enter to reduce the risk of double taxation that would hinder
trade and investment relationships between them. 151
The ITR allocates wealth—in the form of taxing rights—among sovereigns when
persons within them share some relational trade or investment relationships. It therefore
seems like an optimal mechanism to settle relational-distributive claims triggered by
trade relationships. It also aligns well with the assumptions of my analysis; it accepts the
existence of sovereign nation states and their imperative role in any mass global
redistribution enterprise, and develops a distributive framework that is based on
observable current-trade-indicators, avoiding problems of causation associated with
corrective justice. Most importantly, it avoids both the daunting gaps in recognizing
foreigners’ rights and the task of assigning those rights with meaningful correlative
duties.
Using the ITR to promote relational-distributive duties has some other significant
benefits. First, under the relational framework, duties correlate with the level of
association, and this correlation is built-in into the tax arena. For example, assume that a
double taxation treaty between a developed and a developing country assigns
proportionally high taxing rights to the developing country. As the volume of trade
between the two countries increases, the stronger their relational duties are assumed to
be. As their trade relationships intensify, the ITR would account for the higher level of
duties automatically—simply by assigning more taxing rights to the developing country.
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Second, allocating taxing rights seems to be a relatively effective way to fulfill
relational redistributive obligations. Other ways of meeting relational redistributive
duties could involve particular price-control and labor-law standards that would be
difficult to regulate and enforce. 152 Moreover, any attempt to regulate the production of
goods and labor standard in developing countries seems politically infeasible because of
the (justified) suspicion that it is really an excuse for protectionism. Any such attempt is
therefore likely to be classified by developing countries as an imperialist intervention and
rejected on that account. Developed countries can obviously address their relational
duties also by directly spending to help others in developing countries; however, gaining
the necessary domestic support for large lump-sum transfers would be difficult. 153
In comparison to those mechanisms, fulfilling relational-distributive duties
through the ITR would provide a crude and more administrable macro price-correction
mechanism. Rather than making sure that importers of coffee pay a fair price to the
farmers, the developing country would retain a greater right to tax the profits of this
transaction. It can then use the extra revenues generated to provide better services to
their low-waged citizens. Money is fungible, and once it is allocated to a developing
country, there is no way to trace whether it has reached the “farmers.” However, it will
serve to raise the living standards and government services in a way that should also
benefit the farmers. Oddly, this argument relates in an interesting way with the current
orthodoxy that the tax system redistributes more efficiently than regulation. 154
Admittedly the way in which the Article describes international taxation and its
relationship with international trade seems to align with what critics of this orthodoxy
claim—that the distinction between state tax and regulatory actions tend to blur on the
margins. 155 However, the Article also illustrates that the tax system is the most effective
way to redistribute. This effectiveness stems from the crudeness of tax rules and their
(limited) reliance on few indicators as rough proxies to determine the appropriate
distributive outcome. 156
Third, private parties from the developed world would not necessarily be
penalized with excessive duties because they chose to undertake a transaction with parties
in developing countries. Their taxes do not necessarily have to increase because
developed countries would be required to give up some of their taxing authority, and,
more importantly, developing countries may choose not to exercise all their taxing rights,
or to exercise them at lower rates to encourage foreign investment. There is a genuine
fear that developing countries would be forced through a tax-competitive process to omit
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all of their tax rights in an effort to attract foreign investments. These are of course very
serious concerns for any operational global redistributive ITR arrangement, which are
mostly relevant in the context of corporate taxation. However, if developing countries
are provided also with the ability to effectively waive some of the taxes to attract
investments, this form of wealth redistribution could not be portrayed as promoting
developed countries’ protectionism.
In other Articles, I have stressed that the problem of tax competition is probably
the most salient challenge facing ITR policymakers today, especially in the case of
MNEs. 157 However, the scope of the current paper is limited to discussing the normative
claim or relational distributive duties and the general aspects of the ITR that may help
address them. Without undermining the difficulty that tax competition imposes on using
the ITR as a mechanism to promote global redistribution, addressing these issues in detail
is deferred to a future paper which specifically deals with allocating the tax base of
MNEs.
As I demonstrated, some of the above points involve complicated tradeoffs and
should be viewed as promising reform options but also as potential reasons for concern.
However, the ITR’s relational framework still appeals to a strong intuition that some
economic relationships entail certain costs and that parties should not be able to contract
aspects of the transaction involving negative externalities. If international trade gives rise
to unfair patterns, that should be corrected, and the ITR seems to provide a proper
involuntary framework to impose those duties on specific agents. Taxes are coercive
costs imposed on agents to finance the government’s activities and to achieve certain
distributional goals, and parties cannot and should not be able to exercise full contractual
control to determine their tax treatment. The involuntary nature of tax transactions makes
them an ideal mechanism to address distributive concerns on both the domestic and
international frontiers.
Unlike the Liberal-Cosmopolitan ideal, the ITR relational-distributive justice
framework depends upon the actual choices of agents in different countries who decide to
interact with others. Put differently, rather than trying to establish a flawless world, my
proposal offers a principled framework of how to establish a system of fair international
trade. This is an achievable ambition and should make the ITR a plausible mechanism
for achieving the type of global wealth redistribution that would appeal to policymakers,
more so than any other Liberal-Cosmopolitan cross-border regulatory or transfer
framework. 158
B. The Current ITR Arena
Finally, this Article surveys the ITR’s current institutional and scholarly arena. It
demonstrates how the ITR conventions developed today fall short of addressing any issue
of distributive justice. It then explains the sources of this conceptual deficiency and
briefly mentions a few potential issues within the ITR income tax conventions that could
be reformed to promote the fulfillment of relational-distributive duties.
As mentioned, unlike the domestic realm, where philosophers, economists and
legal scholars all recognize that tax policy is the key policy instrument to promote
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distributive objectives, the distributive impact of the ITR has received little attention by
the literature. Even though more collaboration among economists, policymakers, and
normative philosophers would generally be more desirable, 159 the gap in the case of the
ITR is especially alarming. Philosophers concerned with promoting global distributive
justice tend to completely neglect ITR arrangements and focus instead on how to better
regulate trade. In particular, they focus on issues such as privatization, deregulation, and
agricultural protectionism as they are facilitated by institutions such as the WTO and
IMF. 160 Tax rules are complex and the tradeoffs associated with them are often not
intuitive so philosophers tend to avoid addressing them altogether. Tax scholars, on the
other hand, find it difficult to offer a normative judgment about certain tax arrangements
without a concrete foundation of a normative theory.
One factor that could account for the gap in the literature dealing with domestic
and international tax redistribution is the way in which ITR international institutions have
developed over the last half-century. Currently, there is no international organization that
directly regulates international taxation. Taxation has long been categorized as an
explicit feature of national sovereignty, and, as such, there has been no substantial shift in
taxing authority from the nation-state to international and supra-national institutions, as it
has in the case of trade. 161 The major international forum in which ITR policy is
deliberated and coordinated is the OECD, which is a forum established and dominated by
Western, developed countries. The OECD has been able to create the tax component of
the international trade public grid 162 hrough the model tax treaty (and commentary) that
helps countries to establish treaties to avoid double taxation, but also through numerous,
reports, policy briefs and other publications dealing with tax treaties and issues of
international taxation. the treaty and various other reports and policy briefs, the OECD
has created a network The United Nations and the IMF have also made some efforts to
aid developing countries in establishing their tax systems and in negotiating tax
treaties. 163 The history of those institutions indicates, however, that they have no serious
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ambition to promote global wealth redistribution; 164 this is particularly true with regard to
the OECD, which is by far the most dominant international ITR forum.
In this respect, it is important to note the two following notions. First, even
though coordination has been the main goal of the OECD, there is no a priori reason to
think that it should be their only goal. 165 If institutional reform is required to prevent
unfair trade, the historical limitations of the ITR framework should not be seen as a
normative constraint.
Second, the loose level of ITR regulatory control on the actual allocation of taxing
rights among nation-states does not mean that no allocation paradigm exists. Even
though coordination between sovereigns is not intensive—as in the case of trade—taxing
rights of profits from global trade are de facto allocated all the time. The decision not to
engage in an explicit agreement between sovereigns about how to allocate taxing rights is
a decision in itself, which has its own underlying implications and normative
assumptions. For example, the fact that we have no comprehensive multilateral
agreement that prevents income shifting to low income tax jurisdictions does not mean
that there is no allocation of benefits. Sophisticated taxpayers use the absence of such a
comprehensive agreement to allocate more income to low-tax countries such as Ireland
and the benefits of this allocation is shared by Ireland and the investors at the expense of
other countries. 166
As some important scholars have noted, current ITR debate adopts a neo-liberal
discourse that highlights contractual equity considerations—e.g., reciprocity, nondiscrimination, and economic neutrality/efficiency 167 —and marginalizes issues of
redistribution and poverty reduction. 168 This marginalization of global redistributive
issues should not be determinative of future actions. The ITR involves a number of key
issues that bear directly on the question of how taxing rights between developed and
developing countries should be allocated. The most well-known issue is the conflict
between the notions of source and residency taxation. Many countries, including, most
notably, the United States and the United Kingdom, have reserved the right to tax the
income their individual and corporate residents derive from their activities and
investments in foreign jurisdictions. Even though many other sovereigns have recently
limited or eliminated their residency-based taxes, it has been the dominant approach
throughout most of the twentieth century. 169 The main rationale supporting residency
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taxation is that the burden of financing the government should be allocated among
residents and citizens in accordance with their ability to pay the tax. Since foreign
income has exactly the same purchasing power as income earned from domestic
activities, it should receive precisely the same tax treatment when determining taxpayers’
ability to pay. 170
An additional basis of taxation is source taxation—or the right of the state to tax
the income arising from an economic activity that is taking place within its jurisdiction.
The rationales for taxing non-residents at the source are not self-evident. The main
explanations view the source tax as a benefit tax in which the country of source charges
the business enterprise for using its infrastructures. 171 Developing countries are typically
net-capital-importers and therefore source jurisdictions; in contrast, developed countries,
where most investors reside, have traditionally been perceived as residence
jurisdictions. 172
In previous articles, I have argued that source rules’ notorious complexity is
primarily due to a lack of normative comprehension as to what they are expected to
achieve. 173 The nexus which ties an economic activity to a source jurisdiction is
primarily a normative one, and source rules are bound to be complicated as long as this
normative benchmark is not fully elaborated. The relational distributive analysis
provides an example of such a normative benchmark. When tax policymakers consider
the scope of source and residency taxation, they should consider the impact of relational
duties on the allocation of taxing rights between countries. Increasing the scope of
source jurisdiction, at the expense of residency, 174 therefore, may be required for
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developed countries to satisfy their relational-distributive duties towards developing
countries. This shift in the “right to levy tax” benefits the governments of developing
countries over the governments of developed countries. However, it does not create a
direct penalty on parties in developed countries for the trade relationships they have with
members in developing countries and does not create any disincentives to engage in such
trade. 175 Despite the various costs associated with international trade, countries engage
in it because they think that overall they benefit from it. Meeting the allocative costs
associated with distributive-relational duties that stem out from international trade are
only one type of costs that should be addressed as part of that tradeoff.
A simple example of how relational distributive duties could impact actual tax
allocation arrangements may be helpful. Current ITR conventions grant the residence
country, in which investors reside, the right to tax interest payments they receive on loans
made to foreigners. 176 The source country, in which the borrowers reside, has the right to
implement a withholding tax on those payments, but this right is limited in two important
ways. First, over the years, double taxation treaties have reduced withholding tax rates on
interest, so that most interest payments are subject only to low or no withholding taxes.
Second, any attempt of the source country to waive some of its taxing right is
“swallowed” by the residual tax laid by the residence country. Accordingly, a source
country, like Uganda, is effectively very limited in its ability to tax interest payments, or
to attract foreign investors by waiving its rights to tax them. This state of affairs is by no
means neutral or natural but a result of a long struggle between capital-importing and
capital-exporting countries in the first half of the twentieth century. 177 A possible
arrangement that would take into account developed countries relational distributive
duties toward developing countries would give the latter exclusive taxing rights in
interest payments paid by borrowers within it. This would leave a source country like
Uganda with the exclusive right to tax and with the ability to waive some of its rights to
tax in order to attract foreign investments.
Developed countries sometimes make certain concessions to developing
countries—typically within the framework of double taxation treaties. These concessions
are, however, part of the treaty negotiation process and not a normative benchmark that
developing countries can assert. Current practices allow helping developing countries as
a form of foreign policy “charity” given in the form of taxing rights which are “taxexpenditures” and not an integral component of the tax system. 178 This differs from this
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Article’s proposal, which suggests that revising the soft law principles defining the
international income tax base should give heed to global relational-distributive concerns.
Accordingly, the notion that developing countries should be allocated a greater share of
the taxing rights arising from cross-border transactions should be integrated into the
mainstream of OECD double taxation treaty negotiation policy and into the domestic tax
legislation of developed countries dealing with the taxation of cross-border
transactions. 179 This is only one example of how this Article’s normative analysis bears
concrete significance on fundamental questions of allocating taxing rights among
sovereigns.
The most important issue of taxing rights allocation in the contemporary ITR
arena, however, is the taxation of MNEs. MNEs are wealthy, sophisticated taxpayers
with an exceptional ability to reduce their tax liabilities and are also generators of
economic activity who know how to organize particularly effective tax lobbies. 180
Therefore, the corporate tax rate is particularly susceptible to pressures of tax
competition, and recent evidence suggests that effective corporate income tax rates on
certain activities are very low, partly as a result of tax competition. 181 More importantly,
intra-MNE trade accounts for much of international trade and is currently one of the
weakest links in the existing ITR paradigm, considering MNEs’ ability to manipulate
intra-group prices to inflate their deductible costs in high tax jurisdictions and to shift
their income to low tax jurisdictions (especially with regards to intangible-related and
financial transactions). 182 However, MNE taxation is technically complicated and
sophisticated from a policy perspective, because it connects global relational-distributive
duties with issues of tax-competition, tax-avoidance, and tax-cooperation. Because of
this complexity, and because this Article is deliberately focused on conceptual theory and
argumentation, the precise redistributive role of relational-distributive duties on the
allocation of the MNE tax base will be addressed in a future paper. 183
It is, however, important to note that MNEs’ dominant position in global economy
dictates that the MNE tax base allocation bears immense international distributive
implications and should therefore take into consideration relational distributive
obligations. Furthermore, many tax academics believe that effective tax cooperation is
necessary to address problems associated with tax competition over MNE investments.
To achieve effective tax coordination, states would have to assure that a critical mass of
states coordinate with it. This would obviously include most developed countries, which
are typically high tax countries, but would also have to include many low tax developing
and emerging economies—such as Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, which are key players
179
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in the global economy. These developing countries typically use their low corporate tax
rates to attract foreign investment. Accordingly, unlike the developed countries, which
stand only to gain from effective tax coordination, developing countries may fear to enter
such a cooperation scheme because the short-term costs may outweigh the long-term
(speculative) benefits.
To assure effective cooperation developed countries needs to assure a prisoner
dilemma type of setting where all participants stand to gain from tax-cooperation. This
can be done in three ways, which are not mutually exclusive and could be implemented
simultaneously. First, developed countries can threaten developing countries so that they
are penalized if they do not tax-cooperate (e.g., via trade sanctions). Second, developed
countries can try to buy the cooperation of a sufficient number of developing countries.
Third, and most relevant in the context of this inquiry, tax-cooperation could be
facilitated if it involves an organizing principle which parties consider as fair. This precoordination stage is essentially a constitutive moment. Upon entering a long term
cooperation scheme, more states would be willing to cooperate if they have the
confidence that the agreement they are entering into is a fair one, and that it would be a
fair one twenty years down the line whether their economic position improves or gets
worst relatively to the position of other countries. In a way, this Article addresses the type
of questions over what is a fair arrangement that would be asked once nations realize that
tax coordination is essential.
Relational-distributive duties should not be restricted to income tax allocation,
however. Many developing countries have weak income tax regimes and rely on tariffs,
real-estate taxation and natural resources taxation. Relational-distributive duties require
policymakers to expand beyond traditional ITR arrangements, which for historic reasons
focus on the allocation of income taxation. 184
The above discussion of how the ITR’s income tax allocation could be reformed
to promote relational-distributive duties emphasizes the importance of this Article’s
proposal. The relational-distributive duties’ framework aims to promote a realistic
utopia. Rather than erasing all flaws from the world and reconstructing novel political
institutions, it accepts some existing political structures and tries to make the world a
better place by pointing out how and why these institutions should promote justice.
Rather than promoting a set of “soft” principles of cosmopolitan justice, it provides
guidance for constructing a global system which redistributes wealth among sovereigns
by assigning concrete entitlements and duties.
How these duties should be assigned is not an easy task. Globalization gave rise
to new types of tax practices and created a powerful new class of international investors,
comprised of MNEs and individuals with liquid wealth. Sovereigns have found it
increasingly difficult to address these problems by themselves. In the long run, this
inability to address problems of eroding tax bases would likely pressure governments to
engage in cartel-like arrangements to combat tax avoidance and tax competition
tendencies. Any future tax cooperation arrangement would have to include important
developing economies to be effective and would have to grant them some concessions in
return for their willingness to limit the tax breaks with which they lure foreign investors.
Developing a normative benchmark over the proper global distributive role of the ITR is
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therefore essential to provide any future coordinated scheme with the necessary global
political legitimacy.
The notion that to gain political legitimacy, international institutions should be
taking a more active role in promoting fair trade and assuring the rights of peoples living
in the developing world has been receiving growing support.185 As such, delineating an
international ITR framework that addresses peoples’ relational-distributive duties is
crucial to help politically legitimize the operation of institutions coordinating global ITR
policy. Specifically, this legitimacy will be vital to further allow the ITR to evolve and
meet the challenges of the twenty first century. More importantly, however, an ITR that
explicitly addresses issues of global relational-distributive duties would help to morally
legitimize the political structure of global trade itself and the actions of agents
participating in it. 186
Even though the ITR may be an effective tool to address relational distributive
duties in a multi-state global environment, the above analysis suggests that current ITR
arrangements require many modifications before they actually meet this goal. This need
for modifications does not weaken the argument for the appropriateness of the tool,
however. ITR arrangements are relatively superior to any type of alternative
arrangements and the modifications required in them do not undermine the underlying
premises of our political reality. They do not require the abolition of states or the
regulation of commerce in foreign countries—and they cannot be viewed by developing
countries as unjustified imperialist intervention in domestic matters.

VIII. Conclusions
This Article broadens the exploration of current political philosophy over the
scope of distributive duties in an economically integrated world. Our international
trade relations give rise to relational duties to those we trade with. These duties give
rise to obligations when developed countries unfairly trade with disadvantaged
developing countries, even if we cannot agree on the scope of (impartial) distributive
justice. These relational-distributive duties deviate from the traditional political
philosophy debate about issues of impartial global distributive justice. Instead of
drawing on either Cosmopolitan or Statist theories, it draws on the intuitive notion
that the advantaged have an obligation to establish political institutions that protect
the vulnerable from being unfairly exploited.
This approach of seeking justice through relationships succeeds where both
Liberal-Statist and Liberal-Cosmopolitan positions fail, by providing guidance to real
world policy questions of how to best construct international institutions. While not
the only mechanism available to construct international institutions, this Article
demonstrated how the ITR could be modified to accommodate considerations of
relational-distributive duties.
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Taxes involve money, and (whether intended or not) the way sovereign states
allocate the right to tax among each other has a significant distributive impact on the
way global wealth is allocated. Thinking about global wealth distribution through the
ITR will be useful to policy makers because it accepts the existence of states and
relies on the importance of actual relationships, which, whether we like it or not, are
key to any real world attempt to promote issues of wealth redistribution among
peoples.
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